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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
China's growing nuclear arsenal poses a twofold danger
in the post -Cold War era. The increasing capability of the
weapons coupled with China's unwillingness to cut back on
its nuclear weapons improvements makes China a potential
nuclear power in the twenty- first century. China's economic
modernization program forces the military to sell many of
its advanced weapons and technologies in order to fund their
own developmental programs.
Of growing concern is China's tactical nuclear weapons
development, deployment and proliferation. Exercises by the
People's Liberation Army, complete with mock tactical
nuclear weapon detonations, underscore China's intentions of
using these weapons if attacked.
In conjunction with its military modernization however,
China is making strides towards resolving its many disputes
with its neighbors. China's rapprochement with Russia,
Vietnam, and India indicate a willingness on China's part to
cooperate internationally and to resolve disputes
peacefully.
China has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,
ascribed to the International Atomic Energy Agency's
safeguards and has acceded to the Missile Technology Control
Regime's export regulations; but while China may abide by
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the letter of the law, it is not quite following the spirit
of the law. This is evidenced by its selling of short-range
ballistic missiles to Syria, Iran and Pakistan. China has
not sold any nuclear warheads to date, however its sale of
nuclear power technology and liberal assistance to other
countries' nuclear power effort could, in the long term,
become a destabilizing factor to global peace.
Despite China's growing military capability, especially
its nuclear inventory, China's military strategies remain
defensive in nature. China continues to improve the sea and
air legs of its small nuclear triad and is pushing hard to
improve the range and precision of its strategic ballistic
missiles. The increasing vulnerability of its coastal
regions, its economic zones and its industrial base in the
event of a nuclear war, even a limited one, constit jtes a
powerful incentive for the Chinese to improve their archaic
military structure and maintain a credible nuclear deterrent
capability.
This thesis examines China's evolving nuclear
capabilities, and looks into the motivations behind China's
nuclear policies. By informing ourselves about China's
nuclear aspirations, delving into its security and foreign
policy concerns and examining its historical strategic
perspective, we can perhaps gain some insight into China's
nuclear motivations. The thesis then makes some conclusions
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about the implications of China's nuclear agenda on American
foreign policy.
China, as potentially the world's fastest growing
economic and nuclear military power, deserves the attention
and consideration that any important nation receives in our
foreign relations policies. The United States should
continue the normalizing of relations with China including
military- to-military contacts, high and low level government
interrelations as well as earnestly engaging China as an




China's nuclear agenda poses one of the gravest dilemmas
for the post cold war world J Its rapidly developing
nuclear weapons capability forebodes a potential military
threat to global peace as well as a nuclear stranglehold
within the Asia-Pacific region. Its arms proliferation
practices, especially in the ballistic missile market,
could contribute to regional instabilities threatening to
embroil the United States in messy confrontations with
China's less- than-peace loving clients. Its rapidly
modernizing military in conjunction with an opportunistic
Communist regime could possibly throw the world, including
the United States, into another recurring nightmare of
preparing for global nuclear war.
This thesis investigates the possibility and the
consequences of a nuclear armed China using its power to
' The term nuclear agenda for the purpose of this
thesis refers to nuclear policies, nuclear weapons and
nuclear power plants. Included in the definition of nuclear
arms proliferation is the sale of missile systems, whether
conventional or nuclear tipped; dual technologies that can
be used towards the development of missile systems as well
as nuclear weapons; nuclear power plants; and the expertise
(human, written resources, and materiel) required to develop
an indigenous nuclear industry whether it be weapons
manufacturing or nuclear power generation or both.
protect and promote its national interests. China's nuclear
capabilities do not necessarily present a major military
threat to the United States or to the Asia-Pacific region.
My hypothesis, however, is that a nuclear capable China does
present a major foreign policy challenge to the United
States as a result of its arms proliferation policies in
conjunction with its growing economic leverage and its
government's uncertain political future.
While China's nuclear capabilities are substantial, it
is the proliferation of these capabilities to other
countries that represents the major military concern for the
United States; not an antagonistic " ant i -American" China.
China has stated that it does not seek global domination
nor regional hegemony but wants to coexist with all nations
and continue its successful economic evolution. China
maintains that its military is defensive in nature; that its
nuclear weapons only represent a continuing deterrent
capability in a constantly changing global military
environment; and the current modernization of both is a
normal activity of a rapidly developing nation upgrading its
forces in the interest of adequate self-defense.
This thesis will examine the validity of China's
arguments. The challenge to American foreign policy makers
is interacting with a China that is finally achieving its
full economic potential, a China as secure in its national
defense capability as it is justified in its evolving role
as a major regional power.
This appraisal of China's nuclear agenda rejects the
commonly accepted chauvinistic attitudes casting China as a
dangerous and threatening enemy.
Successive chapters in my thesis will show at the
historical basis for China's pursuing a credible nuclear
capability and present an abridged history of that nuclear
development. They will delineate China's current and near-
future nuclear capabilities, and review China's policies
regarding nuclear war, arms proliferation, and future
nuclear development. After examining China's foreign policy
intentions vis-a-vis its regional neighbors as well as the
world powers, my thesis concludes with the implications of a
modern, nuclear and economically strategic China for
American foreign policy.
B. RELEVANCE OF THIS SUBJECT
The demise of the Soviet -communist regime has presented
the United States with the opportunity to reassess its
relations with other nations in the context of a new
political environment. As the world struggles to establish
a new stable order, America must understand that stability
in the global political environment is not static. It is a
dynamic of constantly changing relations as old and new
nations redefine themselves. The United States must be
willing to explore new options and enter into cooperative
exchanges with constantly changing nations.
China is one of the most important of these changing
nations and it presents one of the more important
opportunities that America should explore in an increasingly-
vital region of the world. Realizing these opportunities
however, necessitates a reassessment of the military-
capabilities and intentions of China. This cannot be done in
the fog of a past aversion to communist states. America
must accept the fact that China is a powerful and
independent nation that is not ideologically identical to
the old Soviet -communist ally. America should take care not
to portray China in the same way that we portrayed the
former Soviet Union, specifically as a powerful and
threatening enemy that had to be contained and, if
necessary, destroyed at all costs. We simply cannot afford
another Cold War, neither can the world. China has
different goals and aspirations from those of the former
Soviet regime, and in many ways these goals and aspirations
are identical and complementary to our own. This thesis
concentrates on the nuclear aspect of China's military power




My historical perspective has been derived primarily
from three fundamental studies: China Builds the Bomb , by
John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai; Communist China's Strategy
in the Nuclear Era , by Alice Langley Hsieh; and Sino-Soviet
Military Relations by Raymond L. Garthoff.
I have relied upon journals, periodicals and newspapers
for facts and policy statements regarding China's weapons
capabilities and policies. World Armaments and Disarmament
by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; and
Jane '
s
various volumes on different military capabilities of
the world's nations were especially informative. The
Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports on China
were extremely useful . The International Missile
Proliferation Pro;^ -3Ct and the Emerging Nuclear Suppliers
Project at the Monterey Institute of International Studies
provided a miraculous database replete with facts, articles,
policy statements and hard evidence concerning China's arms
proliferation practices.
Journals predominately used covering the subject
included Asian Survey . Foreign Affairs . The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science and
International Security . Far Eastern Economic Review . The
China Bulletin
. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and Arms
Control Today represent the periodicals most helpful towards
finding documented current events on China's nuclear program
and foreign policies.
II. CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT OF THE BOMB
A. INCENTIVES
On 16 October 1964 China detonated it first nuclear
weapon. This represented a decisive step in the march of
China to its recognized status as a great power. The
detonation was the end of a formidable push to gain atomic
power and knowledge and the beginning of a modern China
prepared to play a major role in international politics as
the newest member of the Nuclear Club. The detonation also
represented China's constant obsession with achieving and
using technological capability as a major underpinning in
its quest to be considered a major modern world power. This
was to become a recurring motif in China's 'ivolving modern
history and still holds true today.
The detonation of the atom bomb also represented proof
of Chinese self-reliance as well as testimony to China's
rapidly evolving scientific and technological capabilities.
China's decision to pursue a nuclear capability was preceded
by several international events that caused China to
reevaluate its position in the arena of international
politics. This reevaluation brought about a change in its
national security objectives as well as its alliance with
the Soviet Union. The outcome of this reevaluation was the
Chinese atomic bomb. It is with these events that this
chapter concerns itself.
1. Korean War Impact
China's entrance into the Korean War in 1950 marked
the beginning of a short but significant alliance with the
Soviet Union resulting in substantial Sino-Soviet military-
assistance. The horrendous casualties sustained by the
Chinese People's Liberation Army forces in Korea at the
hands of the superiorly armed American forces forced China
to confront its inadequate military capability and the
vulnerabilities this presented.^ [Ref. l:p. 8]
The stark realizations of the Korean War made a large impact
on the Chinese military command and induced them to
"modernize under fire" their armed forces. Mao's "People's
War" while not abandoned, was restyled as "People's War
Under Modern Conditions" allowing for the incorporation of
modern military technology and modern warfare required to
fight a modern day enemy. While the strategy of guerilla
warfare was not abandoned, the Korean War required new
tactics and Mao's doctrine proved flexible enough to
incorporate the fixed line defenses and uses of aircraft,
heavy artillery and guns to augment the People's Liberation
Army. [Ref. 2:p. 103]
^Estimates of Chinese casualties: by June 1951-
-
577,000 (73,000 of which were non-combatant casualties) and
16,500 prisoners of war taken by allied troops.
China's modernization program began with a massive
infusion of Soviet weaponry during the Korean War and
continued as a close Sino-Soviet military cooperation
alliance at war's end. Soviet fighter aircraft, bombers,
submarines and destroyers were transferred to the Chinese.
This military assistance became a heavy burden to China
since it was required to buy the weapons from the Soviets
thereby incurring a debt of over two billion dollars by
1957, only one half of which had been paid. [Ref. 3:p. 85]
Dependence on Soviet military weapons kept China
developmentally reliant on the Soviet Union in the early
1950' s, but by the end of the decade China resolved to rely
primarily on itself for its technological development. This
resolve was unwittingly aided by Stalin who, by forcing the
Chinese to pay for their weapons' transfers, denying them
access to military production techniques, and transferring
obsolete equipment which would have to be replaced shortly
with newer Soviet materiel. He endeavored to keep China
dependent on the Soviet Union and therefore weak.
This pattern, the Soviets forcing Chinese dependency
through selective Soviet military assistance, would be
continued during the early stages of China's quest for the
atomic bomb. However, the duplicity of the Soviets
(characterized by their refusing to send China the prototype
of an atomic weapon as promised at the critical phase of
development) as well as deep ideological rifts between the
two countries, would eventually compel China to pursue its
nuclear program on its own. These same rifts would also
result in China eventually targeting their nuclear weapons
on their former Soviet allies. Initially, however, Soviet
military assistance during the Korean War helped China begin
the modernization of its armed forces and to realize the
important role of modern weaponry and technological
capability in a nation's security.
Another impact of the Korean war was the realization
of the political clout a nuclear armed country had over a
non-nuclear capable nation as represented respectively by
the United States and China. President Eisenhower,
endeavoring to end the Korean War after his election in
1952, conferred with his military commanders. Their
possible strategies to end the Korean War and bring about an
armistice included the use of atomic weapons, blockading the
Chinese mainland and attacking Chinese troops in Manchuria.
President Eisenhower hinted at of the possible use of
nuclear weapons against Beijing. [Ref. l:pp. 13-14] Chinese
response to the United State's "nuclear blackmail" was to
dig in deeper and prepare for nuclear war. However, several
months after the policy of possible nuclear weapons use had
been iterated and after the death of Stalin (resulting in a
Soviet government less inclined to support the Chinese war
in Korea) , China acquiesced to American demands and an
armistice was signed.
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Much debate remains whether the threatened use of
nuclear weapons or the changing political environment in
Moscow actually brought about Chinese capitulation to
American demands. There is little doubt however, that
Chinese concerns over United States' emerging policy of
resorting to nuclear weapons to contain China in Asia caused
it to reevaluate its non-nuclear status. After President
Eisenhower's 1954 State of the Union address in which he
presented the nation with the new "massive retaliation"
strategy, the Chinese government:
...denounced the military tone of the president's
address to the nation. ..' Its main points [which]
are... to build up atomic weapons [and] to develop new
weapons ... in order to intimidate and to maintain a tense
international situation.' [Ref. l:p. 19]
Chinese concerns over perceived American
aggression towards China were further underscored by the
evolving alliance between the United States and the Republic
of China (ROC or Taiwan) . The talk of completion of a
defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan in late
1954 and of a possible Chinese Nationalist attaches on the
mainland precipitated a Communist China response that led to
yet another confrontation between China and the United
States, this time in the Taiwan Straits. [Ref. l:p. 22]
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2. Taiwan Strait Crisis Impact
Conflict between Communist Chinese forces and Chiang
Kai-shek's Nationalist forces had been sporadic since 1949.
Since neither side regarded the Chinese Civil war as ended,
Mao regarded the question of the Nationalists and Taiwan as
"unfinished business" that had to be temporarily put aside
at the onset of the Korean War, Neither side had much
energy for the Battle of Taiwan as long as hostilities raged
in Korea.
An end to the Korean war in 1954 once again brought
the Taiwan question to the forefront as Nationalist forces
continued to mount attacks against the mainland by harassing
Soviet and Chinese ships bound for mainland China's ports.
[Ref . l:p. 24] Tension between Communist China and the
United States also remained high as the United States sought
to develop a foreign policy in Asia that designed to contain
the Communist Chinese threat. United States nuclear carrier
battle group patrols in the East China Sea did nothing to
allay China's concerns either. Despite sporadic fighting in
the straits and tense relations however, the incidents were
not viewed as overtly threatening to American vital
interests in the area.^ [Ref. l:p. 30] However, the
^ Lewis in China Builds the Bomb refers to two U.S
intelligence estimates in September of 1954 that basically
conclude that China would be expected to resort to "probing
actions" to test U.S. resolve rather than risk attacking
Taiwan and entering another war against the United States.
This is in fact what China did when they resorted to simply
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Eisenhower administration continued to express alarm over
the Communist (Soviet as well as Chinese) intentions in the
area and made several political overtures to contain them,
one of which culminated in the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty signed in September of 1954. Additionally,
Taiwan had pressured the United States into signing a
bilateral mutual defense treaty to be effective in the event
of war against the mainland. It was with concern and
mounting anger at the interference of the United States that
Communist China felt compelled to act.
The resulting "crisis" that ensued was more a
political reaction by China with military action merely
ancillary to the political goal of testing American resolve
in the Taiwan Strait. China did not relish entering another
war with ^.he United States. China contented itself with
the occupation of the Dachen Islands far to the north of
Taiwan (rather than invading Quemoy or Taiwan itself)
.
Nationalist troops withdrew from Dachen, having previously
determined the islands indefensible and expendable. China
also shelled the offshore islands without making any attempt
to occupy them, (see note 2) . In this way China sought to
"warn off" the United States from meddling in what it
considered internal affairs and to express its displeasure
shelling Quemoy and Matsu rather than invading the islands
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with growing American offensive "imperialistic" designs in
Asia.
In January 1955, the Senate agreed to the
ratification of the mutual defense treaty and Congress
passed the Formosa Resolution (refer Appendix A) giving
President Eisenhower authority to employ troops in the
region to protect Taiwan. Some intelligence units in
Washington warned that a bilateral defense treaty would be
"not only [be] unnecessary, but provocative" and that the
already firm ties between Taipei and Washington were
sufficient to keep the Communists from invading Taiwan.
[Ref. l:p. 31]
The signing of the defense treaty did not result in
a buildup of American forces in the area beyond the two
nuclear carrier groups already present. However, John Lewis
agrees with political scientists Morton Halperin's and Tang
Tsou's assessment that American threats baclced up by defense
treaties and patrolling nuclear capable ships were construed
by China to mean that the United States was willing to
defend any aggression against Taiwan or the offshore islands
of Quemoy and Matsu with nuclear weapons. [Ref. l:p. 34]
They maintain that the Chinese were merely reacting to a
crisis rather than initiating it. The perceived threat of
nuclear weapons deployed close to the mainland and
aggressive containment measures advocated by the United
States government presented yet another incentive for a
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weaker China to develop a nuclear weapons capability of its
own. Thus in 1955, when internal debate persuaded the
Chinese that a nuclear weapon was attainable, a decade- long
push for a strategic weapons capability began.
B . RATIONALE
These international events leading up to China's
decision to develop nuclear weapons served to underscore the
Chinese government's determination to protect the nation
against enduring military threats and to bolster the
fledgling communist country's status in the international
arena. In this respect, the nuclear bomb was from the
beginning developed primarily as a political instrument
designed to increase the clout of China with what it
perceived as the dual threat of a nuclear capable Soviet
Union and United States. Indeed Mao Tse-Tung had openly
displayed his disdain for the nuclear bomb as an effective
military weapon during a 1946 interview with the American
correspondent Anna Louise Strong in Peking. During the
course of the conversation Mao made clear his view of the
impracticality of atomic weapons as military offensive
weapons and put forth his view of the overwhelming power of
people versus materiel:
Strong: Suppose the United States uses the atom bomb?
Suppose the United States bombs the Soviet Union from
its bases in Iceland, Okinawa and China?
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Mao: The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S.
reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible,
but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a
weapon of mass slaughter, but outcome of a war is
decided by the people, not by one or two new types of
weapon.
All reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance,
the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality they
are not so powerful. From a long-term point of view, it
is not the reactionaries but the people who are really
powerful .. .Take the case of China. We have only millet
plus rifles to rely on, but history will finally prove
that our millet plus rifles is more powerful than Chiang
Kai-shek's aeroplanes plus tanks.... [Ref. 4]
Clearly Mao did would not admit that the atomic weapon as
the sole answer to China's security problems and openly
deprecated American threats to resort to nuclear weapons as
force posturing and ineffective, in the long run.
In the short term however, he recognized the potential
of nuclear weapons, especially as a political card to be
used against the diplomatic and policy pressures of a more
powerful United States. Mao sought to break the "nuclear
monopoly" of the United States and the Soviet Union and
ensure the ability of China to pursue its sovereign right to
"display, deploy, and commit its armies" [Ref. l:p. 35] and
to pursue its foreign policy objectives without
interference
.
Several 19 63 statements by the Chinese government
reflect their long held views that nuclear weapons should
not be limited to only a few powerful nations and that
China's possession of nuclear weapons was primarily a
counterweight against the nuclear superpowers:
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Nuclear weapons in the possession of a socialist
country are always a means of defense against nuclear
blackmail and nuclear war.
There are more than 13 countries in the world. All
countries, big or small, nuclear or non-nuclear, are
equal. It is absolutely impermissible for two or three
countries to brandish their nuclear weapons at will,
issue orders and commands, and lord it over in the world
as self -ordained nuclear overlords, while the
overwhelming majority of countries are expected to kneel
and obey orders meekly, as if they were nuclear slaves.
The time of power politics has gone forever, and major
questions of the world can no longer be decided by a few
big powers. [Ref. 5]
In conjunction with the growing realization of the
political power of nuclear weapons there possibly existed a
growing Chinese concern over whether the Soviet nuclear
umbrella would extend to China. Seeming Soviet reluctance
to help China take Taiwan or take action against the United
States should it attack China with nuclear weapons during
the Taiwan crises of 1954 and 1958, may have raised
questions about the limits of the existing Sino-Soviet
alliance. [Ref. 6:pp. 17,18]
Unsure of how willing the Soviets would be towards
defending China against nuclear attack or supporting China
in its Asian foreign policies against United States wishes,
China began to perceive its efforts to rely upon the Soviet
Union's nuclear capability as a feasible nuclear deterrent
for itself as an unacceptable risk. Alice Hsieh theorizes
in her book "Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era",
that adding to China's concerns over Soviet nuclear policy
was the power struggle taking place in the Soviet Union
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between Malenkov and Khrushchev. The ensuing debate between
the two Soviet leaders involved, among other things,
differing views on how the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal
should be used and the implications for Soviet deterrence.
Malenkov favored "pure deterrence" which would have involved
a certain amount of disengagement from the Far East and thus
a resulting loss of support for Chinese foreign policy
aspirations. Krushchev favored "war fighting" deterrence
and favored a more involved commitment to Asia which
included a strong Sino-Soviet friendship. [Ref . 6:p. 24]
That the Chinese would have preferred the war fighting
deterrent policy of Krushchev is conjecture but probable.
Chinese interest in the Soviets internal debate reveals a
deepening Chinese interest in Soviet nuclear strategy and
its implications.
Krushchev's subsequent visit to Peking in September-
October of 1954 resulted in agreements on economic and
scientific matters [Ref. 6:p. 25] and appears to show mutual
recognition of the importance of continued Sino-Soviet
relations and the potential implications and expectations of
a military alliance. The resulting cooperation between
China and the Soviet Union on the development of China's
nuclear program supports this theory.
Changes within the Chinese People's Liberation Army may
have also served to propel China towards the decision to
develop nuclear weapons as a function of Chinese
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incorporation of Soviet military organization and strategic
thinking. The Constitution of the People's Republic of
China adopted in September of 1954 reorganized the People's
Liberation Army from a strictly revolutionary army into a
formalized and modernized military organization. The
Revolutionary Military Council was replaced with the
National Defense Council and a Ministry of National Defense
was established in the State Council. Thus a more
formalized political and military arm of the defense
establishment was developed with the intention of
professionalizing the military. The reorganization of the
military included compulsory military service, a hierarchy
of ranks and a shift to salaried officers. [Ref. 6:p. 21]
The changes reflected the ascendancy of those military
leaders that wanted a military modeled after the Soviet army
and capable of incorporating military doctrine that would
better allow China to fight modern war.
The foregoing discussion reenforces the view that China
initially developed the atomic bomb to strengthen its
political aims. It was not for aggressive purposes and was
less for winning a war than to prevent a war against China.
Specifically, China's goal was to make China a nuclear power
with enough clout to hold its own against the larger
nations' interferences in its internal and external affairs.
This was the reasoning behind the decision of the Chinese
19
Politburo to pursue an atomic weapons program on 15 January
1955. [Ref. l:p. 39]
C. SINO-SOVIET NUCLEAR ALLIANCE (1954-1960)
Time was of the essence. Mao felt that China was facing
a serious nuclear threat from the strongly anti- Communist
American power across the Pacific. Having engaged in a
significant alliance with the Soviet Union in order to
neutralize any potential threat from the same, China now
sought to use that alliance to help develop its atomic bomb.
China's lack of an advanced industrial base, a strategic
weapons program, nuclear research and manufacturing
facilities, and virtually unknown and undeveloped natural
nuclear resources meant that China would have to develop all
these capabilities while simultaneously grappling with the
complex nature of designing, building and fielding a nuclear
arsenal. Contrary to his policy of self-reliance, Mao
decided that Soviet aid was a necessary prerequisite for
China to quickly obtain a viable nuclear capability. This
led to a series of joint Sino- Soviet agreements that would
result in substantial Soviet nuclear assistance to China
during the critical early years of its nuclear development
program.
In October of 1954, Sino-Soviet agreements provided for
scientific and technical co-operation and the establishment
20
of a Sino-Soviet Scientific and Technical Commission.
[Ref. 7]
The first overt indication of joint Sino-Soviet
development of China's nuclear program was a 17 January 1955
announcement by the Soviet Union of its intention of giving
aid to China and several East European countries including
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and East Germany to help
them research peaceful uses of nuclear energy in exchange
for their providing the Soviet Union with raw materials for
its atomic program.
Ensuing agreements on 2 January and 2 7 April 195 5
provided (a) for joint uranium surveys in China with the
excess to be sold to the Soviet Union and (b) for Soviet
assistance with nuclear physics including the supply of a
nijjlear research reactor with a heat capacity of 6500
kilowatts (increasable to 10,000 kilowatts) and a cyclotron
to China for "peaceful" utilization of atomic energy. The
Soviet Union would also, according to the terms of the
agreements, provide Soviet specialists to help in assembling
the reactor and particle separator and furnish necessary
scientific and technical documents relating to the machines.
China would also receive Soviet radioisotopes for research
until its own reactor and cyclotron were capable of
producing isotopes. China's reactor was to be fueled by
uranium rods containing u"^ to a two per cent enrichment and
21
would also use heavy water as a moderator and coolant.
[Ref. 8]
August 17, 1956 saw further development in China's
nuclear program with another agreement from the Soviets to
aid it in building its nuclear industries and research
facilities. On 15 October 1957 a New Technology for
National Defense Accord was agreed to with the Soviet Union
promising to provide China with a prototype atomic bomb and
missiles along with related technical data. [Ref. l:p. 41]
Clearly China's successful development of its nuclear
power and nuclear weapons industry would have been sharply
curtailed without substantial initial Soviet assistance.
Without the primary "building blocks" of Soviet nuclear
expertise in the form of scientists, materiel, and component
prototypes, China may not have progressed as rapidly or as
successfully in its endeavors. However, taking into account
China's motivations, it is not a foregone conclusion that
China would have been prevented from pursuing its nuclear
program if the Soviets had not given their initial support
and assistance. One way or another, China would have
pursued its nuclear goals as evidenced by its perseverance
after Soviet withdrawal of nuclear assistance.
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D. SINO-SOVIET SPLIT (1960)
1. Causes
As critical as Soviet assistance was to the Chinese
nuclear effort, the alliance between the two nations proved
short-lived.
Differences included the potential uses and
implications that nuclear weapons presented both militarily
and politically. Krushchev was apparently concerned about
Mao's referral to the United States as a "paper tiger" and
his dismissal of the danger that nuclear weapons posed for
global peace. Mao's cavalier attitude indicated to
Krushchev that Mao was not fully cognizant of how powerful
the United States was or how vulnerable the Soviet Union's
position was relative to a potential nuclear threat from the
United States.
In his memoirs, Krushchev accuses Mao of making
insistent demands upon the Soviet Union for both nuclear
technology as well as military and political support in the
Taiwan crisis of 1958 threatening to embroil the Soviet
Union in an unwanted confrontation with the United States.
Krushchev refers to "Chinese ingratitude" for the Soviet
assistance given. He was incensed by the apparent advantage
taken by the Chinese of the Soviets during the ant i- Soviet
uprisings in Hungary and Poland in late 1956. From his
perspective, the Chinese pressured a reluctant Soviet Union
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into providing nuclear aid in exchange for needed Chinese
communist support during a time of crisis in the communist
community. [Ref. l:pp. 60-63] This aid was promised in the
1957 New Defense Technical Accord in which the Soviets
agreed to supply China with a prototype atomic bomb and
missiles
.
Krushchev's assessment was apparently corroborated
by Nie Rongzhen, director of the Defense Science and
Technology Commission and one of the masterminds of the
Chinese nuclear weapons program. In his memoirs, he writes
how the Chinese "seized the opportunity" and negotiated the
deal with the Soviets. He takes credit for "guessing" that
Krushchev would be more flexible about aid to China in light
of his difficulties with Soviet satellite countries and made
the suggestion to Premier Zhou Enlai that China should push
for a Defense Accord with the Soviet Union. [Ref. l:p. 63]
China's push for advanced nuclear weapons coupled with Mao's
view that nuclear war was not potentially devastating to the
planet as a whole and that civilization would continue
despite total nuclear war, put the wisdom of Soviet nuclear
assistance to China in question.
Krushchev also complains of how the Chinese
"tricked" the Soviet Union into providing it with military
equipment for an invasion of offshore islands held by Chiang
Kai-shek that was never intended to occur. He also accused
the Chinese of not providing a complete captured American
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missile, saying that some of the critical components were
missing when the Chinese finally turned the weapon over to
Soviet technicians. [Ref. l:p. 63] It would not be incorrect
to conclude that the subsequent technical cooperation
between China and the Soviet Union was due more to political
expediency rather than solid joint ideological and strategic
goals. Despite the cooperative stance between the nations,
deep differences were already beginning to divide the two.
Another source of friction was Soviet insistence
that the Chinese advanced weapons development be tied
exclusively to Soviet advanced military knowledge,
technology, and experience resulting in Chinese dependence
on Soviet willingness to share this knowledge. The constant
reminder that China was dependent on Soviet largesse and
strategics .^ly inferior to that nation's military and
political might became increasingly unacceptable to the
Chinese and a constant source of friction.
Finally, the growing ideological rifts between the
Chinese and Soviets in both the function of war and the role
of communism led to irreconcilable differences in political
and foreign affairs. Growing Soviet power as well as the
growing awareness of the destructive potential of nuclear
war influenced Krushchev to consider war prevention rather
than embrace the "inevitability of war" espoused by Lenin
and Stalin and still supported by Mao. [Ref. l:p. 66]
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While Krushchev felt confidant that the growing military
might of the socialist camp could thwart any "imperialist
aims" of the Western nations, he was increasingly concerned
about the fate of civilization following a global nuclear
war. Mao, on the other hand, derided such concerns saying:
If the worst came to the worst and half of mankind died,
the other half would remain while imperialism would be
razed to the ground:... in a number of years there would
be 2,700 million people again. [Ref . l:p. 68]
Krushchev and Mao also parted company on the
doctrine of war. Krushchev moved more towards a mutual
retaliation strategy similar to the West's attitude while
Mao continued to hold to his "people's war" and guerilla
warfare tactics and continued to discount the impact of
nuclear weapons on future war. John Lewis recounts a
conversation between Mao and Krushchev on the occasion of
Mao's visit to Moscow in November of 1957 which illustrates
the two leaders' differences on the conduct of future war.
Mao took issue with the Soviet's policy of retaliating
against any aggressor. He said that the Soviet Union, if
attacked from the West, should fall back. .. retreat and hold
back for several years, then push the aggressors back using
guerilla tactics. Krushchev disagreed with Mao that future
war would be fought along the same lines that Chinese
communist forces fought against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek.
[Ref. l:p. 67] He was uncomfortable with the fact that Mao
appeared to reject the military- technical changes that
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advanced weaponry had made to modern warfare and Mao's
seeming discounting of the political realities of a nuclear
world.
Mao, for his part, viewed the Soviet's primary-
reliance on the military- technical aspects of war over the
global political aspects as a weakening of the Soviet
communist ideological leadership. Mao felt the Soviets
would become more cautious in supporting national liberation
struggles and therefore less supportive of Chinese political
and military ambitions. This was all the more troubling
since Mao believed that the Soviets had achieved greater
military parity with the United States with the launching of
Sputnik I in October 1957. He spoke of the "East wind
[prevailing] over the West wind" and the "turning point"
whereby "socialist forces [were] ov-jrwhelmingly superior to
the imperialist forces." [Ref . l:p. 68] Mao felt that the
Soviets were capable of defeating the United States and that
the world, especially the socialist forces, could survive a
nuclear world war.
It was with increasing frustration that he watched
as the Soviets grew more and more reticent about confronting
the United States. Chinese suspicions of faltering Soviet
assistance towards helping them develop their nuclear
weapons were further underscored by Soviet moves to reduce
military tensions with the United States.
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This trend was especially in evidence during the
Quemoy and Matsu incidents in 1958. The Soviets rendered no
military assistance to Peking and only half-heartedly warned
against American intervention in the area. In fact, it was
not until China agreed to ambassadorial talks with the
United States to resolve the situation that Moscow came out
in support of Peking, saying that an attack against China
would be considered an attack against the Soviet Union.
[Ref . 3:p. 110] The Soviet Union waited until the crisis had
abated and any real danger of being drawn into a
confrontation with the United States on behalf of China had
passed. This occurred in early September 1958; later in
October, Krushchev further diluted this weak sign of support
by referring to the Formosa Strait affair as an internal
matter for the Chinese people and that the Soviet Union had
no intention of interfering in a Chinese civil war. [Ref.
3:p. 110]
Continuing deterioration of Sino-Soviet allegiance
was further underscored by Krushchev's call during a Twenty-
first Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on
27 January 1959 for an atom- free zone in the Far East,
ostensively for the avoidance of an atomic war in the
region. [Ref. 3;p. Ill] This was in addition to the Soviet's
unilateral cessation of nuclear testing in March of 1958.
At the time Krushchev called for a ban on nuclear weapons
tests in an effort to preclude the spread of nuclear weapons
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beyond the three powers possessing them at the time: the
Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. It
is perhaps not coincidental that in late 1958, the Soviets
secretly decided to renege on their agreement to provide
China with a prototype of an atom bomb. [Ref . l:p. 61]
2. Implications
The events discussed above forced the Chinese to
rely upon themselves. This self-reliance was accentuated by
several high level policy declarations in 1958. The
doctrinal split between the Chinese and the Soviets was
manifested in the emergence of Chinese military doctrine in
elite publications during 1958 that reiterated Mao's
military philosophy. Garthoff paraphrased the doctrine as
follows
:
(1) It is despicable to rely on foreign countries, foreign
military experts, and foreign military textbooks, and
to despise one's own national military heritage.
(2) Men are what count, not weapons. Revolutionizing an
army is more important than modernizing it. Politics
and the inclination of people's hearts, not military
technique, are what decides victory or defeat in war.
(3) Slavish reliance on the Soviet Union (by name) has had
a very harmful effect on Chinese military
modernization, and has caused defects and detours.
(4) The nation in arms, a vast militia, organized in
communes, is the best form of mobilizing for total
war.
(5) Mao's military thinking ("People's" guerrilla war) is
still valid, even for modern war. .
.
(6) "Dogmatism" is the blind following of foreign
experience. Such fetters should be broken off, and
combat tactics made to conform with actual conditions
in China... [Ref. 3:pp. 102-103]
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While discounting the long-term effects of nuclear
weapons on Chinese military doctrine, Mao still recognized
the need to develop a nuclear weapons capability as well as
the need for Soviet assistance. However, considering their
diverging political and ideological views, it was
increasingly apparent that China had to prepare to develop
those weapons without Soviet assistance or Soviet
constraints. To that end, Mao chaired a conference of the
Central Military Commission from May 27 to July 22, 1958
that John Lewis believes delineated China's nuclear weapons
program. "The Guidelines for Developing Nuclear Weapons"
constituted eight guidelines paraphrased as follows:
(1) Our country is developing nuclear weapons in order to
warn our enemies against making war on us, not in
order to use nuclear weapons to attack them. . .
.
(2) The main reason for us to develop nuclear weapons is
to defend peace, save mankind from a nuclear
holocaust, and reach agreement on nuclear disarmament
and the complete abolition of nuclear weapons.
(3) To this end, we have to concentrate our energies on
developing nuclear and thermonuclear warheads with
high yields and long-range delivery vehicles. For the
time being we have no intention of developing tactical
nuclear weapons
.
(4) In the process of developing nuclear weapons, we
should not imitate other countries. Instead, our
objective should be to take steps to "catch up with
advanced world levels" and to proceed on all phases
[of the nuclear program] simultaneously."
(5) In order to achieve success rapidly in developing
nuclear weapons, we must concentrate human, material,
and financial resources....
(6) It is time for science and scientists to serve the
Party's policies, not for the Party's policy to serve
science and scientists. Therefore, we must guarantee
the Party's absolute leadership of this [nuclear
weapons] project...
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(7) The task of training successors [for the nuclear
weapons program] is as important as the manufacture of
nuclear weapons.
(8) We must set up a separate security system so as to
guarantee absolute secrecy. [Ref. l:p. 70]
In light of an impending Sino- Soviet falling out,
China had begun to prepare itself to undertake its nuclear
weapons program on its own under "Chinese conditions." Mao
set out the task of simultaneously developing all phases of
a nuclear program (fuel development, bomb design, missile
technology) with the use of indigenous techniques,
scientists and research. Furthermore, he set a time frame
of ten years to accomplish his delineated tasks. This
estimate was backed up by Nie Rongzhen.
Although China was determined to pursue its nuclear
agenda on its own, China did not initiate the eventual
Soviet pullout from China. While seemingly contradictory,
Mao, having advocated self-reliance, still intended to make
substantial use of Soviet nuclear assistance. The Soviets
by 1959, however, had determined that an end in assistance
to China's nuclear efforts was in order and began the
systematic withdrawal of their scientists and engineers.
The transfer of material was stopped, including the promised
atom bomb prototype. By 1960, the Soviet withdrawal of
assistance was complete and China found itself alone in
continuing its nuclear development.
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E. DEVELOPMENT OP THE BOMB AND THE DELIVERY SYSTEMS
1. Ambitions
As mentioned earlier, the detonation of the atomic
bomb was only beginning of an ambitious undertaking to
develop simultaneously the atomic bomb and the means to
deliver it. Development of strategic ground-to-air and air-
to-air missiles received the highest priority along with the
detonation of the atomic bomb. [Ref. l:p. 51] The decision
to build missiles and deliverable bombs heavily influenced
the choices the Chinese made concerning the procedures
adapted for the entire nuclear program. Because they wanted
a reliable weapon immediately and intended to "leapfrog"
technologies (developing weapons without progressing through
all or any of the normal developmental stages in-between
different capabilities) , China proceeded initially with the
more difficult nuclear fuel process of manufacturing
enriched uranium 235. It also decided upon developing the
more difficult, but more reliable, implosion triggering
mechanism for its first bomb. Tackling these advanced and
incredibly difficult techniques early in its nuclear weapons
development program enabled China to achieve phenomenal
success in a relatively short period of time in developing
its advanced weaponry. (refer Appendix B)
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2 . Personnel
Although original Soviet aid was critical, Mao
understood that China had to eventually be able to
indigenously manufacture and control its strategic weapon
industry. Reliance on Soviet expertise and aid was only a
temporary measure. China would ultimately have to rely upon
itself to develop the necessary scientific personnel,
industrial infrastructure and indigenous capability to build
its own nuclear weapons.
With a view towards this, China had been assembling
a strong cadre of nuclear scientists and engineers capable
of reading Russian manuscripts. The more prominent of these
scientists became the core cadre of personnel to develop
China's nuclear program and most had been trained abroad.
Mcvjt notable were Qian Sanqiang who studied nuclear physics
in Paris and would become head of the Institute of Atomic
energy and was the expert on fission in uranium. Peng
Huanwu studied in Edinburgh with Nobel Laureate Max Born and
was an expert in quantum field theories and cosmic rays. He
would join Qian Sanqiang in China's weapons program helping
to design China's first fission and fusion bombs along with
two of his students Zhou Guanghao and Huang Zuqia. Also
among the top cadre of scientists were Wang Ganchang who
studied in Berlin and was a specialist on radioactivity and
Qian Weichang, a missile expert, who had studied at the
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California Institute of Technology's Jet Propulsion
Laboratory. [Ref. 1: pp. 44-45]
In addition to these scientists, thousands of
technicians were also trained both within China and in the
Soviet Union. An elaborate bureaucracy of "Academies" and
"Bureaus" was established to intertwine research and
development with the education and training of China's
burgeoning population of nuclear scientists and technicians.
This required tremendous coordination, massive
amounts of manpower and an enormous bureaucracy to support
the concurrent but separate research fields. The basic
outline of the nuclear weapons organization is represented
in Appendix C.
The Defense Science and Technology Commission was
responsible for overall direction and control of the
strategic scientific and technical resources of the military
and oversaw the strategic missile program and nuclear
weapons program. The commission was headed by Nie Rongzhen.
The Fifth Academy was China's missile research and
development organization and was responsible for designing
and building the long range missiles that would carry
nuclear bombs and defend China against nuclear attack from
either the United States and the Soviet Union.
The Ninth Bureau, later called the Nuclear Weapons
Bureau, coordinated the development and testing of the atom
bomb design with the missile systems being developed by the
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Fifth Academy. This bureau oversaw several organizations.
One of these was the Beijing Nuclear Weapons Research
Institute which began the initial research and development
of China's first atom bomb. The Beijing Institute acted as
a transitional research institute until the Northwest
Nuclear Weapons Research and Design Academy (also known as
the Ninth Academy) had been built and could carry on the
designing and manufacturing of the bomb. The Beijing
Institute later took on the primary tasks of training and
initial weapons research. [Ref. l:p. 141]
The Second Ministry of Machine Building ran the
strategic weapons industry and consisted of several bureaus
some of which are described in the following paragraph.
Song Renquiong was the initial minister until 1960 when Liu
Jie took over.
It incorporated the Ninth Bureau discussed above, as
well as the Geological bureau responsible for uranium
prospecting, the Mining and Metallurgy Bureau responsible
for controlling the major uranium mines and the facilities
processing the uranium, the Fuels Production Bureau in
charge of nuclear fuels, the Construction Bureau in charge
of building the factories and installing machinery, and the
Equipment Manufacturing Bureau, responsible for the
manufacturing of materials, instruments and other equipment.
[Ref. l:p. 55]
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Clearly, China was fully capable of supporting its
ambitious agenda towards nuclear independence and had
developed the hunman potential and the organizational
infrastructure to do so.
3. Early Accomplishments
The major thrust of China's military industry from
1956 to 1981 was the development and deployment of its first
generation nuclear-armed missiles
.
[Ref . 9:p. 6]
To achieve this, the Chinese undertook tasks on all
phases of their nuclear weapons program simultaneously, from
uranium mining to missile design to atom bomb development.
They were able to do this by creating "national lead centers
to anticipate and solve critical problems before mass-
production units became operational. The centers would give
guidance and training to the emerging mass -production
facilities and serve as their backup research unit", several
of which were described above. [Ref. l:p. 94] In this way,
the Chinese were able to partition their nuclear weapons
program into separate parts, develop the different phases
independently but concurrently, then reassemble the
different phases to bring their nuclear bombs and delivery
systems on line simultaneously or at least with shorter lead
times between developments. The effect of this strategy was
a remarkable advancement in strategic weapons development.
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Since the Chinese were basically starting from
scratch, they initially relied heavily on foreign
technologies rather than inventing or discovering the basics
of nuclear weapons design themselves. This initial strategy
made Soviet assistance crucial. Soviet cooperation not only
provided the Chinese with examples of rudimentary weapon
systems but also gave them the basics on processing nuclear
fuel, designing and manufacturing a triggering device,
building an atom bomb and ultimately designing and
manufacturing the missile system capable of delivering
nuclear weapons
.
The Soviets only provided the Chinese with the basic
blueprints and introductory technical training to initially
begin their program. The 1960 Sino-Soviet split however,
cut off further advanced assistance at a delicate
stage... just when the Chinese were beginning to manufacture
and design the components to build their bomb. They were
essentially left with a few blueprints, some rudimentary
missiles and a myriad of unanswered questions about
processing and manufacturing the essential elements for
their nuclear bombs and missiles. Despite this handicap,
the Chinese took the knowledge they had accumulated from the
years of Soviet assistance and proceeded with the
development of their strategic weapons.
Since China was concerned primarily with defending
itself against nuclear attack from the United States and/or
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the Soviet Union, it concentrated its efforts on missile
systems capable of defending itself against these threats/
With this in mind, the Chinese leadership in 1956, assigned
the Fifth Academy with the task of developing long range
missiles capable of reaching the United States. [Ref. 9:p.
7] These missiles were being developed at the same time as
the Ninth Bureau was working on China's first atomic bomb.
Utilizing first the R-1, a Soviet missile with a two hundred
seventy kilometer range, as a prototype, the Chinese
attempted to begin work on their first missile. It was too
simple a design for the purposes of the Chinese however. It
was not until Krushchev, under the Sino- Soviet New Defense
Technical Accord of October 1957, agreed to sell China two
R-2 missiles with a range of five hundred ninety kilometers,
that the Chinese were able to begin their ballistic missile
efforts. [Ref. 9:p. 8]
The Soviet R-2 (known to the West as the V-2) , was
used primarily for educational purposes by the Chinese for
learning how to manufacture, test and launch a missile
^ It would be useful here to point out the differences
between Chinese definitions of missile ranges and the United
States definitions. The Chinese only consider missiles with
ranges above 1,000 kilometers as strategic. Chinese missile
ranges are defined as follows: short-range, less than 1000
kilometers; medium range, 1000-3000 kilometers; long-range,
3000-8000 kilometers with a sub- category of intermediate-
range of 3000-4,800 kilometers; and intercontinental -range,
over 8000 kilometers. The United States-Western definition
of "medium- range" missile is one that can carry a 450
kilogram payload 2 60 kilometers or more.
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system. Redesignated the 1059, the Chinese launched their
version of the R-2 on November 5 of 1959. These missiles
were conventionally armed. [Ref. 9:p. 8]
As progress was made towards the testing of its
first atomic bomb, China began to work on a series of
Chinese ballistic missiles capable of reaching American
targets in Japan and capable of carrying a nuclear payload.
It must be noted that the explosion of the first atom bomb
on October 16, 1964 marked China's induction into the
nuclear club. But the explosion of its air dropped hydrogen
bomb on 17 June 1967 heralded China as a nuclear power to be
reckoned with.
The detonation of the three megaton thermonuclear
device made the development of nuclear armed long-range
missiles viable for the Chinese nation. The combination of
massive warhead yields with fairly accurate delivery systems
became an achievable goal for the Chinese nuclear weapons
scientists. With this in mind, the Deng Feng (East Wind)
series of missiles began development as early as 1958.
These were Chinese developed land-based missiles, the first
of which was to have a range of two thousand kilometers and
a payload of one thousand five hundred kilograms and was
designated the Deng Feng 1. [Ref. 9:p. 13]
The Deng Feng 1 was patterned after the Soviet R-12
missile which Chinese rocket students studying at the Moscow
Aviation Institute had managed to gain some information
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about. The R-12 was not sold to the Chinese and all
development of the Deng Feng 1 was based on the knowledge
that the students were able to cull from their Soviet
instructors and bring back to China surreptitiously. The
Deng Feng 1 was fueled with a storable liquid propellant and
had a lift-off thrust of sixty four tonnes but still did not
meet the requirement of reaching the continental United
States that the Chinese government was striving for.
Work on the Deng Feng 3, an intercontinental missile
with a projected range of ten thousand kilometers (thus able
to reach the United States), was begun in November of 1961.
However, the project proved too ambitious for the fledgling
missile programmers and the economic crises of the Great
Leap Forward coupled with improving relations with the
United States and souring relations with the Soviet Union,
resulted in the canceling of the intercontinental ballistic
missile, temporarily. Scaling back their ambitious missile
program and returning to a more realistic plan of
incrementally designing longer range missile systems, the
Chinese continued to concentrate on the shorter range
missiles, the Deng Feng 1 and Deng Feng 2. It was not until
June 19 64 that a successful launch of a redesigned Deng Feng
2 missile was achieved. This missile had a shorter range
and smaller payload than the yet to be successfully tested
Deng Feng 1, but it marked a continuing advancement by the
Chinese in their missile program. [Ref. 9:p. 15]
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One of the biggest difficulties facing the Chinese
was the development of a missile capable of carrying a
nuclear device. The atom bomb exploded on 16 October 1964
weighed one thousand five hundred fifty kilograms, still too
heavy for the projected one thousand five hundred kilogram
payload of the redesigned Deng Feng 2 already underway.
Realizing the shortcomings of their successful missile, the
Chinese decided to redesign the as yet untested Deng Feng 1,
extending its operable range to two thousand five hundred
kilometers with a payload of two thousand kilograms. This
would enable the missile to reach United States bases in
the Philippines and carry the hydrogen bomb then under
development. The newly designed Deng Feng 1 was renamed the
Deng Feng 3 (taking over the designation of the now defunct
intercontinental ballistic missile) and was successfully
launched on December 26, 1966. The Chinese had acquired an
intermediate range ballistic missile capable of carrying a
nuclear device. [Ref. 9:p. 16]
The Chinese continued to improve the Deng Feng 3
increasing its range to two thousand six hundred fifty
kilometers by 1971. It was this version of the Deng Feng 3
that China eventually sold to Saudi Arabia in 1988 after it
had deployed a Deng Feng 3A capable of reaching two thousand
eight hundred kilometers in 1986,
The successful tests of its medium- range (Deng Feng
2A) and intermediate -range (Deng Feng 3) missiles finally
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made the development of an intercontinental ballistic
missile an attainable goal. As early as March 1965, the
organization responsible for carrier rocket research, (the
First Academy) , set a goal of deploying four types of
missiles in eight years. Two of these missiles were the
medium- and intermediate -range Deng Feng 2A and the Deng
Feng 3 and were already well advanced. The next two
projected missiles represented a systematic advancement in
missile range towards their long term dream of an
intercontinental missile capable of reaching the United
States. [Ref. 9:p. 17]
Research and development on the Deng Feng 4, a two-
stage missile with a range of four thousand kilometers and a
payload of two thousand two hundred kilogram payload capable
of hitting United States bases on Guam, began in March 1965.
It was successfully flight tested in January 1970. Sino-
Soviet military confrontations resulted in the Deng Feng 4
being upgraded to a range of four thousand seven hundred
fifty kilometers and therefore capable of reaching Moscow.
This version became operational in 1980. [Ref. 9:p. 17]
Research on the Deng Feng 5, an intercontinental
missile with a projected range of twelve thousand kilometers
and a payload of three thousand kilograms, was begun
simultaneously with work on the Deng Feng 4. However, work
on the Deng Feng 5 was more difficult because it utilized
many new technologies that the Chinese had to develop while
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the Deng Feng 4 used already proven components used in the
Deng Feng 3. (Indeed, the first stage of the two stage Deng
Feng 4 was a Deng Feng 3 and it also utilized the Deng Feng
3's propellant and guidance system.) The two stage Deng
Feng 5, on the other hand, required larger engines, a
different propellant, vernier combustion chambers for
attitude control on its second stage, a gyro-stabilized
platform, an on-board computer for flight control and a new
body made of a less easily welded aluminum- copper alloy.
[Ref. 9:p.l8] The delays caused by these new technologies
resulted in the Deng Feng 5 being flight tested over a year
and a half after the Deng Feng 4 in September 1971.
The worsening relations between the Chinese and the
Soviets and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan in 1979,
resulted in the Denj Feng 4 and Deng Feng 5 being deployed
before they were completely operational. In the case of the
Deng Feng 5 it was deployed before its silos were even
complete, but the perceived threat to China by the Soviets
directed the accelerated deployment of the missiles.
Meanwhile, continued upgrading of the Deng Feng 5 missile
was carried out as late as the early 1980 's extending the
range to thirteen thousand kilometers. [Ref. 9:p. 19]
Despite the setbacks and false starts, the Chinese
showed remarkable resiliency and perseverance. They
developed from inauspicious beginnings a viable strategic
weapons system in less than thirteen years and with
43
continued improvements had a credible nuclear defensive
force by the 19 80' s. This achievement has been unmatched by
any other nuclear power.
P. CONCLUSION
From this recital of China's nuclear development a
conclusion of great importance to American policy makers is
inescapable. China's pursuance of a nuclear capability was
as much an achievement of national self-esteem as it was a
political-strategic goal. It pursued its goals with a
single-mindedness that was bolstered by tremendous national
will, strong organizational capability, and superlative
dedication to rigorous achievement. It did this by using
small, highly specialized design teams, rigorous prototyping
and testing, and high quality assurance. Despite its
underdeveloped science and technology industries, it managed
to develop an advanced nuclear industry that in many ways
was as responsible for developing its technological base as
it was responsible for providing an adequate defense of
China. Finally, China undertook its nuclear development in
the face of a perceived nuclear threat from the United
States, not as an effort to become a nuclear super power.
Nuclear weapons were developed and deployed as an addition
to their defensive capability not as part of a separate
nuclear strategy, underscoring their initial intentions of
protecting themselves from a nuclear threat.
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III. NUCLEAR POLICIES
A. NUCLEAR POLICY INFLUENCES
China's nuclear policies can be explained partially by-
its affirmed security objectives, foreign policy goals, and
economic goals as well as taking into account its nuclear
capabilities. (Its defense policies will be reviewed in
chapter four along with its current nuclear capabilities.)
Unfortunately, China's characteristic reticence in
discussing its nuclear capabilities, strategies and policies
make a clear understanding of its intentions difficult to
discern. Because of China's "shyness", one must divine its
nuclear agenda by considering what it has done compared to
what it has said it would do with its nuclea-^ weapons.
Moreover, understanding how China views itself in relation
to the rest of the world as well as exploring its domestic
political and economic goals for self-sufficiency will help
to explain its security concerns and how those concerns have
affected its nuclear policies and development.
1. Security and Foreign Policy Objectives
a . Introduction
The role of China as the "Middle Kingdom" has
evolved from its ancient view of itself as the crossroads
bridging the expanse between the Western nations and the Far
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Eastern nations to its more recent role as the "third most
important power"; a nation counterbalanced between the two
superpowers represented by the United States and the former
Soviet Union. [Ref. 10]
Its importance as an independent nuclear power
notwithstanding, changes in China's position on a number of
nuclear issues have continued to be influenced by its
changing positions on economic policy, the end of the Cold
War, and its increasing military capability; all of which
have brought about a China more prone to embrace western
ideals on nuclear proliferation and arms control.
In all of its manifestations however, it has
sought to remain aloof and independent of entangling
alliances and has struggled to minimize the impact of
foreign influences and interferences into its internal
affairs. Deng Xiaoping' s characterization of socialism with
Chinese Characteristics has been a major guide in modern
Chinese developmental policy as well as foreign relations:
Our modernizations must proceed from China's actual
situation. Be it revolution or construction, we must




countries' experiences and patterns has never succeeded.
We have learned many lessons in this regard. One basic
conclusion we have drawn from our long historical
experiences is to... follow our own course....
Independence, self-reliance, and charting our own
course are the political foundations of the theory on
building socialism with Chinese characteristics.
[Ref. ll:p. 28]
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Essentially, Deng meant that China must do what
is good for China and that its modernizations and its
relations must proceed with this basic tenet in mind. This
philosophy underlies China's independence in forming its own
nuclear policies that do not always coincide with the west's
notion of responsible nuclear stewardship.
Concurrently, China has been consistent in its
foreign policy polemic by denouncing "imperialism" and
"hegemonism" , whether Soviet or American (or more recently,
developed nations versus developing nations) . It disparages
the resulting interference into a nation's sovereignty that
it believes these two nations' and their allies' polices
have engendered and refuses to be bullied into making
accessions on policy matters.
The above characteristics lend themselves to
China's aligning itself, in spirit, with the developing
world; often speaking in defense of the underdeveloped
nations' concerns against developed nations' policies. This
perception of itself as a developing nation resisting the
attempts by developed nations to limit and direct its
military as well as its economic and foreign policy goals
has influenced China's position on all nuclear issues such
as proliferation, weapons sales and arms control.
In support of its foreign policy goals, China's
security objectives have been described as:
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• Building itself into a country that is economically
prosperous, politically stable and militarily sufficient
in its own defence, capable of ensuring that its
sovereignty and territorial integrity be respected and
not subject to violation from the outside;
• Laying particular stress on a good neighbor policy with
the purpose of establishing friendly and cooperative
relations with neighboring countries so that the people
on both sides of the border can live in peace and,
hopefully, in harmony;
• Developing friendly relations with all countries in the
world on the basis of the "five principles for peaceful
coexistence, "^ to work together with all peace loving
forces towards the relaxation of international tension
and the keeping of world peace, to strive for
international economic security in order to strengthen
international security as a whole and thus to create a
lasting and peaceful environment for China's own
construction. [Ref. 12]
jb. Early Nuclear Policy Influences
The new People's Republic of China was very
concerned with its inability to fend off the emerging
superpowers' interferences into its national development.
The prestige that nuclear weapons gave these nations weighed
heavily in China's decision to develop some nuclear force of
their own. This reason for China's developing a nuclear
capability was succinctly iterated by Deng Xiaoping in 1957:
^. The five principles of coexistence were first laid
out in a 1954 agreement between China and India and
proclaimed: "mutual respect for each other's territorial
integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, mutual
noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality
and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence." Initially
applicable to socialist states in Asia and Africa, the
principles have since been applied to relations with all
nations including the United States. They remain a guiding
focus in China's modern day foreign policy.
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The Soviet Union has the atom bomb. Where does the
significance lie? It lies in the fact that the
Imperialists are afraid of it. Are the Imperialists
afraid of us? I think they are not... The United States
stations its troops on Taiwan because we have no atom
bombs or guided missiles. [Ref. 13]
The political power and implied military security
attached to the development of a Chinese atom bomb was a
major factor in the newly emerging republic's pursuit of a
nuclear capability.
Another determining factor was the concurrent
technological and scientific development that would occur
along with the development of the atom bomb. China, unlike
the western nations, did not undergo the technological and
economic advancements the Industrial Revolution of the
nineteenth century generated because its dynastic rulers
prevented modern influences from reaching China. They opted
instead to keep China solidly in its ancient traditions and
thereby maintain control over China. Subsequently, the
newly emerging communist nation found itself woefully
underdeveloped and poor. This reality was poetically
depicted by Qian Sanqiang, one of China's foremost atomic
nucleus physicists and one of the original scientists
working on China's fledgling nuclear program:
For more than a century, the Chinese nation had remained
backward and vulnerable to attack, had been invaded and
ravaged. Could we impute this to China's poor and backward
economy? To its inability to develop any sort of enterprise
or cause? Could it be said that China lacked people of
lofty ideals or that the Chinese were inferior in
intelligence? Definitely not. The root for this historical
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humiliation lay in the ignorance, corruption and
incompetence of the rulers of past dynasties....
...In November 1949, after the Chinese Academy of Sciences
was established, it began at once, with effective support of
the government, to change the previous situation so that
science could truly serve the country's industrial,
agricultural and defence construction, the people's health
and their cultural life. The late Premier Zhou Enlai gave a
special instruction: It is necessary to develop new
disciplines, such as atomic nucleus science and experimental
biology. Before long, the first atomic nucleus science
research organization, the Modern Physics Research Institute
(later renamed the Atomic Energy Research Institute) under
the Chinese Academy of Sciences, was established.
[Ref. 14]
Accordingly, the development of the Chinese atom
bomb became a key element in Mao Tse-Tung's goal of
establishing China as an industrialized, influential, and
economically viable nation independent of western alliances.
Mao's goals remain the cornerstone of China's modern day
security objectives and China's evolving nuclear capability
remains a fundamental component of the achievement of its
security and foreign policy objectives.
China's security goals also influenced its
consistent "no- first use" pledge regarding the utilization
of its nuclear weapons. China clearly delineated its
position regarding its reasons for developing nuclear
weapons and its defensive intentions vis-a-vis their use in
a statement released on 16 October 1964, the day of their
first atom bomb detonation:
. . .This is a major achievement of the Chinese people
in their struggle to strengthen their national defence
and oppose the U.S. imperialist policy of nuclear
blackmail and nuclear threats. . .
.
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. . .To defend oneself is the inalienable right of every
sovereign state. To safeguard world peace is the common
task of all peace-loving countries. China cannot remain
idle in the face of the ever- increasing nuclear threats from
the United States....
...The atomic bomb is a paper tiger. This famous
statement by Chairman Mao Tse-tung is known to all. This was
our view in the past and this is still our view at present.
China is developing nuclear weapons not because it believes
in their omnipotence nor because it plans to use them. On
the contrary, in developing nuclear weapons, China's aim is
to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers and to
eliminate nuclear weapons. China is developing nuclear
weapons for defence and for protecting the Chinese people
from U.S. threats to launch a nuclear war....
. . .The Chinese Government hereby solemnly declares that
China will never at any time or under any circumstances be
the first to use nuclear weapons. . .
.
...China's success in making nuclear weapons is a great
encouragement to the revolutionary people of the world in
their struggles and a great contribution to the cause of
defending world peace. On the question of nuclear weapons,
China will not commit the error of adventurism or the error
of capitulationsism. . .
.
. . .more and more countries are coming to realize that the
more exclusive the monopoly of nuclear weapons held by the
U.S. imperialists and their partners, the greater the danger
of a nuclear war. They are very arrogant when they have
such weapon:-, they will not be so haughty, their policy of
nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats will not be so
effective, and the possibility of complete prohibition and
thorough destruction of nuclear weapons will increase.
...If those countries in possession of large numbers of
nuclear weapons are not even willing to undertake not to use
them, how an they expect countries not yet in possession of
such weapons to believe in their sincerity for peace and to
refrain from taking defensive measures that are necessary
and within their capabilities...?
...The Chinese Government will, as always, exert every
effort to promote, through international consultations, the
realization of the lofty aim of complete prohibition and
thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Until that day
comes, the Chinese Government and people will firmly and
unswervingly follow their own path to strengthen their
national defence, defend their motherland, and safeguard
world peace. . . . (refer to Appendix D for full text)
[Ref. 15]
This statement declared the positions on nuclear
issues that China was to take for the next two decades.
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Specifically, it called for the complete elimination of all
nuclear weapons by all countries, and until this occurred,
it defended the right of all nations to pursue nuclear
weapons development and called for a "no first -use" pledge
by all nuclear states. It laid the blame for global nuclear
tension at the feet of the United States, alluding to the
"nuclear blackmail" the United States engaged in during the
1950' s. Rapidly deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations
culminating in the border clashes of 1969 eventually
included the Soviet Union in Chinese general disparagement
of superpower attempts to monopolize the world through
nuclear superiority. The foregone conclusion for China was
that it had to develop a viable nuclear capability if it
were to succeed as an independent nation in a world
dominated by the nuclear superpowers.
c. Current Nuclear Policy Influences
The subsequent emergence of China as a medium
nuclear power reinforced its self-appointed role as a
counterweight against superpower hegemony and provided China
with the added political dimension of being capable of
defending itself against superpower influence whether
political or military.
China's security objectives developed into a
foreign policy of "flexible" neutralism and pragmatism that
emphasized the sovereignty of a nation in all its affairs.
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linked China's interests with those of the third world and,
while still warning against hegemonism from the superpowers,
sought to develop better and equivalent relationships with
both the Soviet Union and the United States, in effect
establishing a more balanced triangle of foreign relations
between the three largest nuclear powers in the world.
Former Vice- Premier Wu Xuechien distilled China's
foreign policy objectives during the 1980 's into a "five-
point independent foreign policy of peace":
• Opposing hegemonism and working to maintain peace,
• deciding policy issues pragmatically case by case,
• avoiding alliance or strategic relationships with the
Soviet Union and the U.S.,
• strengthening cooperation with Third World countries,
and
• cooperating on economics, trade, icience and technology
with anyone. [Ref. 16 :p. 5]
This was clearly carried through in its sometimes
conflicting nuclear proliferation and arms control
positions. China, while supporting the disarmament
negotiations between the superpowers and acceding to nuclear
nonproliferation instruments, concurrently maintained its
persistent policy on arms sales that has caused substantial
tension between it and the United States.
2. Influence of Economic Goals
While China's nuclear capabilities increased and it
achieved a viable deterrent force for its purposes; economic
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goals delineated in Deng Xiaopeng's "four modernizations",
(agriculture, technology, industry, defense) , were resulting
in China's adoption of socialist practices (with Chinese
characteristics of course). Subsequently, the 1980's
brought about a shift in China's foreign policy focus from
one of a defensive ideological struggle against superpower
hegemony to a more pragmatic concern with economic expansion
and the global stability that its economic goals required.
Indeed, Paul Kreisberg, Senior Associate at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, surmised in 1988
that
:
...Coastal economic development places even greater
emphasis on enticing foreign investment into China,
developing export markets for the goods these areas
produce, and on preserving good relations with potential
sources for both investment, technology, and markets
the U.S., Japan, Western Europe, and the Asian [Newly
Industrializing Countries. This is the fundamental
policy rudder which has been and seems almost certain to
continue to guide Beijing's policies on all major
questions over the next five [to] ten years at least.
[Ref. 16:p. 17]
Improving relations with the Soviet Union brought
about by the Gorbachev era of perestroika and glasnost, as
well as perceived weakening of the United States economic
position lent itself to a general relaxing of tensions
between the three countries as economic concerns became a
major foreign policy concern globally. China toned down its
ant i -West polemic and sought cooperation with all nations
without compromising its basic foreign policy positions.
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These basic points were recently reemphasized by Chinese
Vice -Premier Zhu Rongji:
...The goal of China's foreign policy is to
safeguard world peace, promote common development and
create a Tavorajble international environment for the
country' s economic reforms, opening up to the outside
world and its modernization drive. . .
.
Over the past few years, the international situation
has undergone drastic and profound changes rarely seen
in times of peace... The tense confrontation between the
two militairy blocs has been removed, and the world
continues to move towards multipolarity. .. .Economic
invigoration has become the main trend of the
time.
.
.With the upsurge of multi-layered economic
cooperation, Asia has maintained a strong momentum of
economic growth.
However, we can not fail to note that the planet on
which we live is far from tranquil .. .Power politics and
hegemonism remain the major obstacles to world peace and
development. With various forces undergoing realignment
and new contradictions intertwining with old ones,
regional turbulence has stood out more prominently.
While economic factors have begun to be weighed more
heavily in international relations, trade protectionism
is on the rise. Global economic development is
extremely unbalanced, with the gap between the North and
the South further widening . In this changing
international situation, China is unswervingly pursuing
an independent foreign policy of peace. .
.
...China will not enter into an alliance with any
country or bloc of countries, nor will it participate in
any military bloc, and... China has always been opposed
to hegemonism and power politics. Jt will never seek
hegemony or engage in expansionism. . .
.
...To establish and develop friendly relations and
cooperation with all countries in the world on the basis
of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence is a
cornerstone of China's foreign policy. ..
...In handling our relations with neighboring
countries, we have always pursued a policy of good-
neighborliness and have made unremitting efforts to
secure long-term stability and mutually-beneficial
cooperation in the region. .
.
China attaches great importance to solidarity and
cooperation with developing countries. . .In whatever way
the international situation may change, China will, as
always, support the legitimate rights and interest of
third world countries in safeguarding national
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independence and state sovereignty and seeking economic
development . . .
.
We hope to see our relations with [western]
countries restored and developed on the basis of mutual
respect, non-interference in each other's internal
affairs, equality and mutual benefit and in the spirit
of seeking common ground while reserving differences . .
.
As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council,
China shoulders a special responsibility for world
peace and stability. It will continue to work with the
international community in an effort to facilitate
political settlements of regional conflicts and
international disputes, promote the process of world
disarmament and arms control, secure common economic
development of all countries in the world and increase
cooperation in environmental protection, human rights
and other fields....
China stands for the establishment of a just and
rational new international order of peace and stability
on the basis of the Five Principles of peaceful
coexistence. ... [Ref . 17]
Zhu Rongji emphasizes one of the most important
influences in China's current foreign policy and,
coincidentally, in its nuclear policies: China's economic
expansion and the importance of international cooperation in
the success of China's modernization efforts.
B. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ISSUES
China's positions on some nuclear nonproliferation
issues have undergone subtle changes over the years since
its acquisition of a nuclear capability. It has continued
however, to make a distinction between "medium" nuclear
powers such as itself, France and Britain and the nuclear
superpowers of Russia and the United States. It applies a
different set of standards to the nuclear superpowers,
describing them as the real threat to world stability and
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safety, not the smaller and emerging nuclear powers. This
was subtly alluded to by delegation head Yu Peiwen at the
1981 Conference on Disarmament in Geneva:
China is opposed to major power nuclear monopoly.
Like many other peace-loving countries, China does not
advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation, and we are
emphatically opposed to any production of nuclear
weapons by racist and expansionists such as South Africa
and Israel
.
The nuclear-weapons states should recognize the fact
that the nonnuclear-weapon states find themselves
menaced by the danger of nuclear war and nuclear threat
and that it is the strong demand of the peoples of the
world that the superpowers halt the arms race and carry
our nuclear disarmament. The nuclear weapons states
should unconditionally guarantee not to use or threaten
to use nuclear weapons against the nonnuclear-weapon
states without further delay, and at the same time, they
should take effective measures to carry out nuclear
disarmament until the ultimate goal of complete
prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons is
achieved. China has unilaterally undertaken the
unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons against nonnuclear-weapon states and
suggest that, when an international convention on
security assurances is elaborated, the inclusion of such
commitments should be taken into consideration.
[Ref. 18]
This has often put China in direct opposition to global
efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons
capabilities. Despite its adamant position, China has made
a few accessions to non-proliferation efforts of late. A
look at these changes and their probable causes may help to
explain China's singular opaque position on nuclear
proliferation issues.
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1. Nuclear Test Bans
One issue that China has not budged on is its
disapproval of nuclear test bans, comprehensive or
otherwise. China expressed great dissatisfaction with the
United States' and the former Soviet Union's nuclear
policies of the 1950' s. As was clearly voiced in its
declaratory statement of 1964, China interpreted their
initial efforts to limit the nuclear development of other
nations through the promulgation of test ban treaties and
nuclear proliferation controls as a direct attempt to keep
China weak and dependant. Since China did not have any
nuclear weapons, any effort on the part of the former Soviet
Union and the United States to prevent their development was
naturally met with strong resistance.
a. Limited Test Ban Treaty
The tripartite treaty between the United States,
the former Soviet Union and Britain called for the
prohibition of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in
outer space, and underwater. It was signed in Moscow on 5
August 1963. [Ref. 19]
The test ban was opposed by China who viewed the
Soviet Union's support for a nuclear test ban as an
abandonment of a "coordinated strategic doctrine for all
socialist states." [Ref. l:p. 193] It was shocked that the
Soviet Union would "collude" with the United States in an
58
attempt to prevent China from developing nuclear weapons and
quickly denounced any nuclear test ban proposal as
interfering in a sovereign nation's right to build an
adequate defense and viewed the treaty as destabilizing
because it would:
bind all socialist countries except the Soviet Union and
all countries subject to aggression, without hindering
the United States from proliferating its nuclear weapons
among its allies and countries under its control.
The tripartite treaty can in no way prevent the United
States from carrying out nuclear proliferation, and it
tends to strengthen the aggressive forces of the
imperialist camp. Can this treaty prevent U.S.
imperialism from proliferating its nuclear weapons, and
the technical data for their manufacture, among the West
German revanchist and other allies of the United States
and countries under its control? No, absolutely not....
[Ref. 23:p. 13]
China's 1963 arguments against the limited test
ban established its main disagreements with any test ban
that did not concurrently prevent the United States from
using, testing or proliferating nuclear weapons or link
nuclear test bans with the elimination of all nuclear
weapons in general
.
China has never acceded formally to the Limited
Test Ban Treaty, although unofficially it has not conducted
any atmospheric testing since 16 October 1980 and in 1986
declared that it would no longer conduct atmospheric nuclear
tests. [Ref. 20]
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b. Comprehensive Test Ban
Prior to its first nuclear detonation, China
called for the elimination of all nuclear weapons and an end
to nuclear testing. [Ref. 21] In effect, China was
advocating a comprehensive test ban. However, after its
first detonation, China was resolute in not acceding to any
limitations on her potential to develop nuclear weapons.
Just as it denounced the Limited Test Ban Treaty, it was
against a Comprehensive Test Ban unless it was specifically
tied to negotiations for the complete elimination of all
nuclear weapons. Then Vice -Premier Deng Xiaoping stated in
1979:
We stand for destroying all nuclear weapons completely.
However, the nuclear powers have no right to prevent
nonnuclear countries from possessing nuclear weapons
unless these powers commit themselves to destroy their
nuclear weapons completely or guarantee not to be the
first to use them. [Ref. 22]
In this respect, China remains defiant in the
face of the majority opinion of most developing nations who
have signed on to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and
have cast the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as one of the
most important steps towards Iceeping the treaty viable after
1995. China is not alone in this position, none of the other
nuclear countries, most specifically the United States, have
been able to negotiate a satisfactory conclusion to the
comprehensive test ban dilemma. However, China is different
from these nations in that it will not even consider any
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limits on nuclear testing without a concurrent global
disarmament of nuclear weapons. Since this is unlikely to
occur, it remains secure in its "ethical" argument for the
elimination of nuclear weapons without fear of having its
continued nuclear development curtailed in the interim.
2. Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
Perhaps one of the most significant events in
China's nuclear policy agenda has been its formal acceptance
of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in January of 1992.
This was a sharp departure from its refusal to sign the
treaty in 1968 on the grounds that it:
did not go far enough to keep the superpowers from
upgrading and expanding their nuclear arsenals while
unfairly preventing nonnuclear countries from developing
nuclear power for peaceful uses. [Ref. 31 :p. 4]
Changes in the international environment, as well as
changes in China's attitudes on nuclear proliferation and
pragmatic considerations all conspired to bring about this
substantial shift in Chinese nuclear policy.
a. Early Proliferation Attitudes
China's main reason for developing a nuclear
weapon's capability was its fear of a nuclear attack from
the United States as was discussed in Chapter II. It
believed that the nuclear monopoly of the United States in
the 1950 's and 1960's posed a real threat to Chinese
security interests. Proliferation was desirable because it
would allow, initially, the Soviet Union and subsequently.
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the other socialist states the opportunity to develop an
atomic capability thus ending America's exclusive nuclear
power. It viewed the situation of a single nuclear power as
inherently destabilizing, a perception that to its chagrin,
was not alleviated by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by
the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union's subsequent cooperation with
the United States to declare a Partial Test Ban, though
initially viewed by the Chinese as an attempt to prevent
German development of nuclear weapons, rapidly disillusioned
Chinese hopes of a complete prohibition of nuclear weapons
when it realized the combined efforts of the three nuclear
powers were to prevent other states from developing a
nuclear capability. [Ref. 23 :p. 10]
Soviet arguments in 1959 that Chinese nuclear
development was unnecessary because of Soviet protection;
therefore the sharing of nuclear technology with China was
not needed, contributed to the Sino-Soviet split. This was
described by a Chinese government spokesman on the occasion
of the Soviet Union's 1959 communique to China denying it
further assistance on its nuclear bomb:
The whole course of events amounts to this: First the
Soviet Government tried to subdue China and curry favor
with U.S. imperialism by discontinuing assistance in an
attempt to induce China to abandon its solemn stand.
Failing in all this, it has brazenly ganged up with the
imperialist bandits in exerting pressure on China.
In view of all the above, China has long ceased to place
any hope in the Soviet leaders in developing its own
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nuclear strength to resist the U.S. nuclear threats.
[Ref. 24:pp.351,2]
It also crystallized Chinese perceptions that the
only way to break the United States' nuclear monopoly was
the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other nations,
starting with its own indigenous efforts:
With regard to preventing nuclear proliferation, the
Chinese Government has always maintained that the
arguments of the U.S. imperialists must not be echoed,
but that a class analysis must be made. Whether or not
nuclear weapons help peace depends on who possesses
them. It is detrimental to peace if they are in the
hands of imperialist countries; it helps peace if they
are in the hands of socialist countries. It must not be
said indiscriminately that the danger of nuclear war
increases along with the increase in the number of
nuclear powers. Nuclear weapons were first the monopoly
of the United States. Later, the Soviet Union also came
to possess them. Did the danger of nuclear war become
greater or less when the number of nuclear powers
increased from one to two? We say it became less not
greater. [Ref. 24:p. 347]
T:. is interesting that China made a distinction
between who had nuclear weapons and the resultant effect
that this would have. It showed some latent consciousness
on the part of the Chinese of the potential liability of a
nuclear armed weapon in the wrong hands. However, China did
not recognize its contradiction and continued to support the
philosophy that nuclear proliferation was a good thing over
the next two decades.^
^ Beginning in the 1970 's China would later revise its
exclusionary position and endorse the spread of nuclear
weapons to any "peace-loving" nation because it would
increase the probability of deterring an American nuclear
attack and would accelerate a general nuclear disarmament.
[Ref. 23]
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The tensions between China and the Soviet Union
during the 1970 's did little to change China's perception of
nuclear proliferation. As Soviet and American concerns over
avoiding nuclear war began to converge and the two nations
attempted to settle disputes amicably whenever possible,
China repudiated what it viewed as the Soviet Union's
betrayal of the communist revolution. China saw nuclear
proliferation as not only the means to reduce both nations'
influence in the world, but hoped to also prevent Soviet
-
American cooperation by multiplying the number of
independent nuclear states in the world and keeping the two
superpowers at each others throats in an effort to maintain
their respective positions of power. [Ref. 23 :p. 35]
The death of Mao and the shifting of foreign
policy objectives supporting violent third world
revolutions, to Deng Xiaoping' s policies of stabilization
and modernization began to temper Chinese proliferation
stances
:
...The development of nations with different historical,
economic, political, and cultural backgrounds is uneven.
Essentially, the efforts exerted by people of various
countries to attain socialism and build a socialist
society are independent movements themselves. Marxists
in various countries should take the initiative in their
own hands, rely on themselves, and, proceeding from
their actual needs, count on their own people and find
their own ways. There will not be a unified mode or
centralized guiding center. [Ref. 11 :p. 27]
The 1980' s saw a visible softening of Chinese
attitudes on nuclear proliferation issues which began with
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tacit Chinese agreement on the spirit of the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty although it did not agree with the
document itself:
We are critical of the discriminatory treaty on the
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, but we do not
advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation. We do not
engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we
help other countries develop nuclear weapons. We
actively support all proposals that are truly helpful to
realizing nuclear disarmament, terminating the nuclear
arms race, and eliminating the threat of nuclear war.
[Ref. 25:pp.351,2]
Economic concerns appear to have had as much of
an impact as foreign policy positions in China's gradual
acquiescence to the treaty. China's need for enormous
amounts of energy to drive its modernizations programs gave
nuclear energy technology top priority in its Sixth and
Seventh year plans (1981-1990). Minister of Nuclear
Industry Jiang Xinxiong announced pla.is projecting the
building of ten nuclear power plants with a projected
generating capacity of ten thousand megawatts by the year
2000. [Ref. 26]
Chinese desires to import foreign equipment and
engineering services and the government's allocation of one
hundred million American dollars in turn elicited American
nuclear power industries interest in providing the services
and equipment. Unfortunately, the absence of a nuclear
cooperation agreement with China at first prevented American
nuclear industries from participating in Chinese projects.
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The subsequent 19 85 Agreement on Nuclear
Cooperation Between the United States and the People's
Republic of China was the result of four years of intensive
negotiations between the two governments to reach an accord
accommodating the United States' Atomic Energy Act of 1954
and its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and China's still
tacit disagreement with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
and noncompliance with the International Atomic Energy
Agency's safeguards on the transfer of nuclear technology.
China's previous stance on nuclear proliferation was not
well received by Congress either. Faced with Congressional
requirements for a redefined position on nuclear non-
proliferation before receiving American transfers of nuclear
technology, China "unequivocally" endorsed nuclear non-
proliferation and on 1 January 1984 joined the International
Atomic Energy Agency thereby requiring safeguards on its
nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states. [Ref. 26 :p.
877-9]
The final step in China's long journey towards an
endorsement of non-proliferation practices was completed in
January 1992 when China formally acceded to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. The rehabilitation of China on the
international scene after the devastating events of Tianamen
Square in 1989 may have contributed to China's concession.
Just as likely, China is desirous of placating Western
concerns about its arms sales, specifically its missile
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technology transfers and sees the treaty as a conduit for
showcasing China's dedication to preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. China's




Because of its early view that a nuclear arms race
existed only between the United States and the former Soviet
Union, initial Chinese positions on the issue of arms
control have been ones of non- interest . China believed that
its nuclear weapons were a stabilizing factor against the
proposed nuclear monopoly engendered by the two superpowers
and therefore took no interest in the initial United Nations
disarmament talks in 1977. As previously described, it felt
that general global disarmament talks were ineffective
without a preliminary avowal by the superpowers to
substantially reduce their nuclear arsenals.
In the 1980' s, with the Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks between the former Soviet Union and the United States
beginning, China revised its initial stance to accommodate
the new arms control developments. At the June 1982 United
Nations special session on Disarmament, China's Foreign
Secretary Huang Hua revealed China's new position linking
superpower disarmament with several confidence building
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measures for global security. He iterated that the two
superpowers should take the lead in weapons reductions, that
conventional and nuclear disarmament should coincide, that
verification rules should be strictly enforceable and that
all nations should have an equal voice in disarmament
negotiations. [Ref. 27 :p. 32] Sounding a
familiar Chinese motif, Huang Hua reiterated China's basic
security premise that:
Small and medium- sized countries are all entitled to
take what measures they deem necessary to maintain their
defense capabilities for resisting aggression and safe-
guarding their independence. The measures and steps
decided at different stages of disarmament must not
prejudice or endanger the independence, sovereignty and
security of any state. [Ref. 28]
China further recommended a two stage process
whereby the superpowers reduced their nuclear arsenals by
fifty percent while other nations agreed to a "no- first-use"
pledge. The second stage after initial superpower arms
reductions would entail the ending of "testing, improving or
manufacturing" nuclear weapons by all nations along with the
rest of the world's nuclear powers joining in a general
nuclear disarmament in agreed proportions. [Ref. 27]
The history-making bilateral Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty signed by President Bush and President
Yeltsin in January 1992, resolved to bring the superpowers
stockpiles down to three thousand five hundred warheads
each, well beyond the fifty percent reduction goal set by
the Chinese for reciprocal arms control initiatives. Calls
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by President Yeltsin for similar reductions in France's,
Britain's and China's long-range nuclear arsenals were met
coolly. On 30 January 1992, China responded to President
Yeltsin's invitation by saying that it would take part in
the disarmament process initiated by the superpowers when
they had reduced their nuclear arsenals to "a level matching
China's". [Ref. 29]
Again, flexible Chinese policy allowed it to avert
any serious initiatives curtailing or reducing its nuclear
arsenal, a position not out -of -keeping with the other medium
nuclear powers. Clearly, China will not easily give up its
nuclear assets and will continue to maintain a viable
nuclear deterrent for as long as it can. It will continue
to encourage disarmament accords as long as it is not called
upon to participate in them.
2. The Intermediate -Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
The Intermediate -Range Nuclear Forces talks in the
early 1980' s which resulted in a treaty in 1987, caused
concern to the Chinese leadership. If the French and
British nuclear weapons were not to be included with the
Americans weapons in the talks, then Chinese weapons should
not be considered along with the Soviets. If American
nuclear interests were decoupled from Europe, then the
Soviets would be free to redeploy their excess European
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intermediate missiles closer to Asia thereby increasing the
threat to Chinese security.
With the concurrent deployment of the Soviet Union's
SS-20's intermediate -range weapons (five thousand km)
targeted at China as well as Europe, China hoped for
continued United States' nuclear engagement in Europe to
check possible Soviet nuclear ambitions in Asia. However,
the disagreements between the two states over deployment of
cruise missiles, which weapons to include in the treaty and
conflicting ideas on what "parity" entailed, did little to
convince Beijing that the disarmament talks were capable of
securing world stability and freedom from superpower nuclear
hegemony
.
The proposal by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in
1983 that Soviet SS-20's be deployed in Siberia and thus
unable to reach Europe, was of greatest concern to the
Chinese. This simply underscored Chinese suspicions that
superpower disarmament talks were nothing more than
manipulations by the two countries to maneuver for
superiority at the expense of third party interests.
Therefore, the sole objective of Beijing was to attempt to
influence the course of the disarmament talks so that the
result would be as less damaging to China as possible.
China made clear the unacceptability of Soviet
-
American nuclear negotiations that might result in the
transfer of Soviet theater nuclear forces capable of
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targeting Asian countries, especially
China. [Ref . 30 :p. 237] China put forward
three principles it desired of the superpower negotiations:
• that the European arms control process be related to,
and closely interlinked with, Asian arms control, that
is, world peace and security is indivisible;
• that there should be no transfer of excess intermediate
missiles from the European part of the Soviet Union to
its Asian territory;
• that the Soviet Union should drastically reduce (not
totally eliminate as was China's position earlier) the
number of SS-20 missiles already deployed in its Asian
territory, that is, there should be global ceilings on
the intermediate nuclear weapons. [Ref. 30 :p. 241]
Chinese efforts to protect itself by influencing the
intermediate nuclear talks resulted in a pledge by the
Soviets to destroy, rather than transfer, their European
intermediate missiles and the United States acquiesced to
"substantially reducing" the superpowers' intennediate
missile arsenals and not include French and British
intermediate missiles in the negotiations. China continued
to push the Soviet Union for the reduction of the number of
its intermediate missiles already deployed on the Sino-
Soviet border. Chinese desires in this respect were met by
President Gorbachev in 1987 when he announced the acceptance
of the elimination of short-range and long-range
intermediate nuclear missiles in Asia and Europe and signed
the Intermediate Range Nuclear Weapons Treaty with the
United States on 8 December 1987. Chinese response to the
Soviet and American arms reduction initiatives was positive
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though tempered by reminders that the superpowers' nuclear
arsenals were only reduced by five percent and that nuclear
war was still a very real threat to world stability. [Ref.
30:p. 263]
Though only a minor nuclear power with respect to
the superpower states, China's influence on the intermediate
talks along with the concerned interest of the other medium
powers, shows the potential difficulties inherent in world
nuclear disarmament talks. As the strategic balance of the
world changes, and as the nuclear arsenals of both Russia
and the United States decline, the implied influence of a
diversified and independent Chinese nuclear capability will
make disarmament objectives of the superpowers harder to
achieve and greatly change the dynamic of their initiatives.
Although China recognizes that its nuclear capabilities are
inferior to the superpowers, it jealously guards whatever
advantage it may possess in shaping nuclear balance.
In the case of the intermediate talks, China was
able to influence the negotiations so that its security
status remained intact. More and more the superpowers will
have to consider China's position in any future disarmament
negotiations. This is further exemplified by China's views
of the Strategic Defense Initiative.
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3. Strategic Defense Initiative
The announcement of President Reagan's Strategic
Defense Initiative in 1983 suddenly raised China's stake in
the issue of disarmament. The vision of a comprehensive
space-based American ballistic defense system capable of
defeating Chinese as well as Soviet long-range
intercontinental ballistic missiles, (and thereby
effectively nullifying China's small deterrent force), was
too critical a situation to ignore. Chinese concern over
the strategic defense initiative was illustrated in 1985 by
Deng Xiaoping' s statement to former President Nixon that:
We are very concerned about the escalation of the nature
of the arms race and are opposed to any arms race in
outer space. We are against whoever goes in for the
development of outer space weapons. [Ref. 31]
Hou Zhitong, China's ambassador to the United
Nations Committee on Disarmament, reiterated this concern in
October 1989:
China is always opposed to the arms race and stands
for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of
nuclear, chemical, and biological as well as space
weapons
.
The development of space weapons has exacerbated the
escalation of the arms race, which leads to the
militarization of outer space, thus posing a new threat
to the existence of mankind and the international
security. The countries with the largest space
capabilities competing for space weapon development
should bear a special responsibility to undertake not to
test, develop, manufacture, and deploy space weapons and
to destroy all the existing space weapons.
[Ref. 32]
China signed the Outer Space Treaty in 1983 [Ref.
76 :p. 602] perhaps out of concern for its inability to
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compete with the United States in a "Star Wars" scenario.
By doing so, it is plausible that it hopes to dispel any
thoughts that it is intending to develop similar systems in
space. It has also participated in the United Nations First
Committee on Issues of Arms Race and Outer Space held in
November 1990 where Ambassador Hou Zhitong once again called
for:
[The prohibition of] the use or threat of use of force and
any other form of hostile activities against outer space
from earth or against earth from outer space.
Although new progress has been made in certain areas of
disarmament in recent years... no due headway has been made
in the important area of preventing an arms race in outer
space
.
It is disappointing that the two superpowers, which
possess the biggest space capabilities, have failed to make
headway so far in prohibiting space weapons, and the
research and development of space weapons have led to a
qualitative escalation of the arms race.
The complete prohibition and thorough destruction of space
weapons represent the most fundamental and effective means
of preventing an arms race in outer space. China shares
with the world community a strong expectation for the
countries with the greatest space capabilities to undertake
fully their special responsibilities for the prevention of
an arms race in outer space, to speed up in earnest their
bilateral negotiations to this end, and to conclude an
agreement at an early date on halting the development and
deployment of space weapons and destroying all such weapons.
China maintains that the conference on disarmament and its
ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer
space should, without any delay, hold substantive
negotiations on an agreement to prevent the arms race in
outer space in all its aspects, to prohibit and destroy all
space weapons, and to ensure the deweaponization of outer
space. [Ref. 33]
China continues its pattern of calling for the
curtailment of potential developments beyond to its own
nuclear capabilities. Considering China's past proclivity
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for rapidly developing capabilities that many thought were
beyond the scope of its technological endeavors, however,
the superpowers would do well to heed China's call for arms
controls in outer space. Including China in any "star wars"
scenario is the beginning of wisdom.
4. Other Nonprollferation and Disarmament Initiatives
In 1985, China endorsed the concept of a nuclear-
free zone in the South Pacific and formally recognized the
Treaty of Rarotonga in 1989. It has previously endorsed a
similar nuclear-free zone in Latin America established by
the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1974. [Ref. 76 :p. 602]
Long an advocate of the abolishment of biological
and chemical weapons stockpiles, China endorsed the Chemical
Disarmament Convention on 13 January 1993. China has long
advocated the destruction of these stockpiles by all
nations, calling upon the superpowers to lead the way with
the initial destruction of their own stockpiles. The 1993
Convention presented China with another opportunity to
demonstrate to the world its evolving position supporting
the control of weapons of mass destruction.
[Ref. 34 :p. 103] China also subscribed to
the Antarctic Treaty (1983) and the Seabed Treaty (1991)
.
D. NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ISSUES
Despite China's assurances of its compliance with
current nuclear nonproliferation regime practices, its
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nuclear related technology transfer practices, (whether
nuclear energy transfers, dual technology transfers or
actual weapons sales) , have remained a source of concern for
the United States. Part of the dilemma for China has been
balancing the economic necessity of its arms and technology
transfers with its need to assure potential advanced
technology contributors that it is responsible regarding the
proliferation of lethal weapons. Its stated policy
concerning the noninterference into a nation's sovereign
affairs and its position regarding attempts by the Western
powers, the United States in particular, in maintaining a
military superiority over the third world also puts it at
odds with the current nonproliferation.
China's disregard for the potential dangers of its
transfers of missiles, nuclear technology and dual-
technologies has prompted the United States to put immense
pressure on China to reconsider its transfer and sales
practices. Of particular concern have been China's recent
arms export practices. Although China has agreed to adhere
to the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime,
the United States and its allies are skeptical about Chinese
intentions to follow strictly the rules of the game.
Third World nations are the main consumers of China's
missile technology and nuclear power exports. Many of these
nations are not signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty and are not bound by the International Atomic Energy
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Agency's safeguards for nuclear technology transfers.
Therefore, they take advantage of China's liberal transfer
policies. They are able to acquire complete missile systems
and subsystems as well as accompanying production assistance
unobtainable in the tightly regulated markets of Western
nations. Of longer term concern, is China's propensity for
assisting client states with assistance in the development
of indigenous missile production capabilities. This
particular practice has resulted in the proliferation of
Chinese-designed missile systems by countries even less
constrained by Missile Technology Control Regimes practices
than China.
1. Chinese Missile and Technology Transfers
The recipients of both China's weapon exports and
Chinese assisted missile producing states' exports are the
very unstable regions of the world that current
proliferation controls are trying to constrain. This means
the Middle East, with lesser concern over sales to Latin
America, South Asia and North Korea. [Ref. 35]
Examples of China's recent and more troubling transfers
follow.
Korea : Chinese missile technology sales to North
Korea as well as substantial Chinese technology assistance
in reorganizing and maintaining Soviet-established assembly
facilities have made North Korea the foremost supplier of
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Silkworm and Scud-B missiles to the Middle East. It is also
believed that China originally intended to assist North
Korea in its ballistic missile program. A six hundred
kilometer range tactical ballistic missile with a one
thousand kilogram warhead code named Deng Feng 61 was
allegedly being developed for sale to North Korea. Since,
for internal "political reasons", the sale was cancelled by
the Chinese, it is unclear whether North Korea ever received
any of the technology associated with the Deng Feng 61.
[Ref. 35:p. 559]
Pakistan: Chinese negotiations with Pakistan over
the sale of its M-class tactical ballistic missiles were
said to have occurred in 1986 or 1987. China is also
believed to have assisted Pakistan's with the development of
its Haft-2 surface-to-surface missile during the same time
period. [Ref. 36] The actual transfer of M-9
missiles to Pakistan have not been confirmed although
deliveries of transporter- erector- launchers for the M-class
missiles had been reported. [Ref. 37] Subsequent
United States sanctions against the transfer of satellite
and computer technology to China because of it missile
transfer practices, (especially the possible transfer of M-
class missile technology to Pakistan, Syria and Libya) were
levied. These sanctions were lifted in February of 1992 in
exchange for China's acceding to the Missile Technology
Control Regime. It is by no means certain that the Chinese
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actually stopped the sales and it may well be that actual
transfers of M-9 and M-ll missiles are in the works.
[Ref. 38]
Saudi Arabia : In late 1987, China sold
approximately thirty intermediate -range ballistic CSS-2(DF-
3) missiles with a range of two thousand kilometers and
equipped with conventional warheads. The contracts included
the building of a launch site and maintenance on the
missiles. This is the only known sale of missiles between
the two countries although it is purported that Saudi Arabia
had considered buying the M-9 short-range ballistic
missiles. Subsequent military considerations associated
with the Gulf War preempted the acquisition of the M-9 in
favor of upgraded F-15E/F's from the United States. [Ref.
35:p. 563]
Iran : The Iran- Iraq War was as much a boon to
Chinese weapons exports as it was for the United States.
During the 1980 's Iran and Iraq accounted for fifty- seven
percent of all of China's weapons sales. Iran received
twenty- two percent of its armaments from China from 19 82-
1989 which equated to over three billion dollars worth of
arms sales to China. [Ref. 39:p.87]
China provided Iran with technical assistance on its
Oghab tactical artillery rocket and sold it one hundred HY-2
Silkworm anti-ship cruise missiles. Iran also negotiated
for two hundred Chinese C-801 cruise missiles. Reports of a
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ten year military technology transfer agreement between the
two countries including the production of M-9 and M-11
missiles have been substantiated by reported sightings of
the production facilities near Ishfahan, Iran in 1991.
[Ref. 40] Chinese assistance in missile production
has helped Iran develop its Iran- 130, a short-range
ballistic missile with a range of one hundred thirty
kilometers. China has also provided Iran with expertise and
technology for the construction of an Iranian nuclear
reactor. China is also supposedly launching a space
satellite for Iran to aid it in the fields of radio and
television transmission, reconnaissance and observation.
[Ref. 41]
Iraq: Sales of hundreds of Chinese C-601 anti-ship
missiles in 1988 were made simultaneously with Chinese
assistance in its "Scud" upgrade program during the Iran-
Iraq War. Though Iraq only accounted for nine percent of
China's arms sales from 1982-1989, the value of the
negotiations amounted to over four billion dollars.
Syria : The ever popular M family of short-range
ballistic missiles also managed to find a buyer in the
Syrians. Syrian interest resulted in a negotiated contract
in 1988 before the M-9 missile had been flight tested,
fueling speculation that the M- class missiles were developed
by China with the express purpose of manufacturing the
weapon for export. Syria is also purported to have provided
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financing for the development of the missiles. Delivery of
twenty- four M-9's with their associated launchers took place
in 1991. China, prevented from delivering the rest of the
negotiated missiles because of its accedence to the Missile
Technology Control Regime's regulations, has substituted
assistance to Syria's Scud production capability instead.
[Ref. 35:p. 562]
2. China's Weapons Manufacturing Bureaucracy
China arms export industry is as convoluted and
opaque as its nuclear policies and strategies. A clear
understanding of who sells what is almost impossible to
discern. Adding to the difficulty is the unique situation
that the Chinese leadership has established by sanctioning
military efforts in raise its modernization funds in any way
that it can. The sub -sequent economic imperative has spawned
a huge weapons industry with apparent little central control
or even planning. What follows is a short description of
China's weapons sales' establishment. While not
comprehensive in scope, it illustrates the efforts the
Chinese have made towards developing their arms industry and
provides some insight into the complexity of Chinese arms
export policy.
China's military establishment, headed by the
Central Military Commission, consists of at least six
autonomous groups each with their own budget, annual plan.
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leadership and power base. The six groups are the General
Staff Department; the Political Department; the Commission
of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense
(COSTIND) ; the General Logistics Department; the National
Defense University; and the Academy of Military Science.
[Ref. 42 :p. 88] The party- state apparatus has
very little control over the various military departments,
thereby making the military hierarchy fairly autonomous.
The power of Deng Xiaoping remains the major cohesive and
political link between the military leadership and the
state-council. However he takes little interest in the day-
to-day policy decisions of running the military, leaving
that to the respective group heads of each department within
the military. These distinct groups have formed separate
networks based on relationships established during China's
revolutionary war and have developed into major power
centers that operate independently of each other. The
absence of a cohesive whole is what makes Chinese arms
control and arms transfer policy practically impervious to
foreign influences. The fragmented military system controls
the two major weapon- export corporations: Poly Technologies
(Baoli Group) and New Era Corporation (Xinshidai Group)
.
These two corporations control most of China's arms trade.
[Ref. 42:p 92]
New Era Group comes under the control of the General
Staff and the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry
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for National Defense. It export military equipment and
weapons manufactured by all of the defense- related military-
industrial corporations and ministries. These ministries
and their special interests include:
• China's Electronics Import and Export Corporation
(CEIEC)
,
(radars, communications, navigation, command,
control , communication and intelligence systems,
simulators, laser rangefinders and other electronics
systems) Beijing;
• China National Aero -Technology Import and Export
Corporation (CATIC)
,
(aviation systems ranging from
advanced fighters, attack aircraft, bombers, primary and
advanced trainers, transport planes, helicopters aero-
engines, missiles and aircraft components) Beij ing and
other locations;
• China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO)
,
(development and manufacturing of armored fighting
vehicles, howitzers, mortars, rocket launchers, anti-
aircraft weapons, anti-tank missile systems, small arms,
ammunition, fire control systems, sighting and aiming
systems, high-performance engines, and Nuclear,
Biological, Chemical protection systems) Beijing,
• China National Instruments Import and Export Corporation
(CNEIC)
,
(sole agent for the export and import of all
research and development and production organizations
connected to the Ministry of Nuclear Industry, including
monitoring and control systems, air filters, rotating
high speed cameras, non-ferrous metals and chemicals)
Beijing;
• China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation
(CPMEIC)
,
(manufactures and markets a wide range of
surface-to-surface, air-launched anti-ship, shipborne
surface-to-surface, coastal defence and tactical
missiles, space systems, rockets, satellites, robotics
vehicles and precision optical and electronic products)
Beijing; and
• China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC)
,
(manufactures warships such as submarines, guided
missile destroyers, frigates and boats, anti-submarine
vessels, landing craft, pontoon bridges, rapid-firing
guns, torpedoes, mines, ant i- ship missiles, electronic
systems), Beijing. [Ref. 43:p. 6]
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Poly Technologies Incorporated is run by a group of
military officers out of the Chinese International Trust and
Investment Corporation (CITIC) giving it a civilian facade.
It sells all types of conventional weapons and military
equipment including mortars, mortar ammunition, anti-tank
mines, fast -attack missile craft, handguns, advanced
military aircraft, various tactical missiles, and surface-
to-surface short- to -medium range ballistic missiles. [Ref.
42 :p. 93] This arms industry also comes under the
jurisdiction of the General Staff, clearance of sensitive
materials comes from the Central Military Commission.
However, control is held by a group of senior officers from
top Chinese leaders' families thus maintaining a vital and
sensitive link between the military leadership and the
political leadership. Poly Technologies has the power to
sell weapons that have not yet been fielded in the armed
services thus giving it more power over weapons sales and
policy than New Era.
The nepotistic characteristic of arms sales
bureaucracy in China has made it a highly aggressive and
secretive organization that is out of the purview of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This creates a problem for
foreign countries trying to influence China's arms sales
policies since they might be negotiating with a ministerial
department that has no control over arms transactions or
arms policies. Criticism by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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over Poly Technologies arms' practices is accepted with
little patience as comments by one of its senior officers
demonstrates
:
We are determined to devote ourselves to raising funds
for promoting the four modernizations of China. This is
a glorious mission that should claim precedence over all
others. Right now the ministry of Foreign Affairs
should review how to serve this mission... It is wrong to
sacrifice the number one mission for the sake of foreign
affairs. [Ref. 42:p. 95]
The power derived from the personal relationships of
the senior officers to the political leadership, as well as
the independence of the Central Military Commission in the
formulation of military policy and especially arms policies,
gives the General Staff and the Commission of Science,
Technology, and Industry for National Defense considerable
control over the sale of weapons. Heated debates often
occur between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials and
officers in charge of weapons - sales . The ministry makes no
money from the sales but it must deal with the displeasure
of the United States, for example, over the sales of such
weapons as tactical ballistic missiles to Iran. More often
than not. Ministry opposition to disputed sales is
overridden by the tremendous profits to be made from the
sale of weapons. [Ref. 42 :p. 96]
This insight into the complexity of China's arms
transfers explains some of the confusion seen in statements




China's intentional aloofness from entangling alliances
was a result of the traumatic Sino- Soviet split in 1960 and
the subsequent failed security dividends from its
association with industrial democracies in the 1970' s.
China believed that the root of all international tension
lay with the superpower confrontation that existed between
the United States and the former Soviet Union and their
attempts to divide the world's nations into conflicting
alliances.
This attitude was reflected in its independent nuclear
policies as well as its independent foreign policies.
Despite its independent and persistent stance concerning its
nuclear development, China has not evolved into a major
nuclear threat to the world. Due in part, however, to its
refusal to be dissuaded from its goal of security against
any nuclear threat, it has become a nuclear power in its own
right
.
Attempts by the United States to impose arms control
regulations, whether addressing arms proliferation or
limitations on countries' nuclear arsenals, have met
consistently with Chinese protestations and accusations of
interference with their sovereign right to self-defense. Of
late the Chinese have modified only slightly their adamant
insistence on total independence.
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China has changed slightly its stance on nuclear non-
proliferation. It has tempered its nuclear power technology-
transfers, acceding to the International Atomic Energy-
Agency's nuclear safeguards. It has joined the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty and has agreed to abide by the
guidelines for missile transfers as set forth by the Missile
Technology Control Regime.
Despite these changes, China still presents cause for
concern to the western nations. Of special significance has
been the niche China has carved out for itself through its
arms sales. China's sales of missile systems, missile
technology and assistance for weapons production to the
Middle East have raised concerns on the part of Western
nations. However, attempts to curb Chinese sales
consistently meets with frustration because of the dichotomy
between arms transfer policy and foreign policy. The
military is in control of the arms transfer policies and has
little regard for the Foreign Ministry's concerns over the
diplomatic controversies generated by the sale of China's
weapons, especially its missile systems. Little change in
China's arms transfer policies is likely to occur as long as
the military reaps substantial monetary rewards from arms
sales which directly fund its modernization.
Additionally, China will continue to resist any attempts
to reduce its nuclear arsenal and cannot be expected to
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willingly engage in any disarmament negotiations that will
limit its comparative nuclear power in the near future.
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IV. STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES
A. DEFENSE STRATEGY
The development of modern Chinese defense strategies can
be divided into two distinct phases representing the heavy-
influences of the two men most responsible for dictating the
course of modern day China: Mao Tse-Tung and Deng Xiaoping.
Mao Tse-Tung' s concept of "People's War" heavily
influenced China's initial modern defense strategy and built
the People's Liberation Army into one of the largest in the
world.
Deng Xiaoping extended Mao's ideas and developed
"People's War under modern conditions" [Ref. 44]
with the end qoal of preparing China for the twenty- first
century. One of the ways of modernizing "People's War"
involved integrating technological innovation with the
concept of massive defense.
Although China's defense strategy has changed, China's
nuclear strategy seems to have remained intact: that of a
minimum deterrent capability evolving to meet changing
technological threats but not large enough to overwhelm any
potential aggressor.
The end of the Cold War appears to have had little
impact on current Chinese nuclear strategy because China had
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already set its course beyond the present day international
environment. China looked forward to the next century in
its initial nuclear development, preparing itself for a
future role of a strong modern China capable of competing
with, as well as defending itself against the major powers.
Nuclear weapons play an important role in the modern-day
defense of China. To understand China's current position on
nuclear warfare one must understand "People's War" and its
subsequent modernization, and must consider China's
distinctive perceptions of the nuclear threat and nuclear
war.
1. Mao's People's War
Mao defined "People's War" as a strategy of "victory
denial" by means of a "protracted war". "Protracted War"
began with the strategic retreat of the Chinese armed forces
with the objective of luring the enemy deep into the Chinese
mainland. Mao saw this as
:
the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our
strategic defensive, [for] a weak army fighting a strong
army must preserve itself to prepare for a decisive
counter-attack. [Ref. 45]
In guerrilla tactics, the irregulars or
unconventional forces are an integral part of the People's
Army. Rich in manpower and territory but lacking in
advanced weaponry and technical knowledge, Mao fought with
whatever resources he had at hand. Unable to face an enemy
on its technologically superior ground, Mao sought to engage
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the enemy in a drawn out pursuit of the Chinese army while
subjecting the enemy to constant harassment. This was
illustrated in his sixteen character formula for guerilla
warfare tactics:
The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we
harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats,
we pursue. [Ref. 46]
Direct confrontation was not a tactical goal in this
first phase of a People's War. Mao envisioned the success
of this stage as a stalemate whereby the Chinese guerrilla
army destroyed the enemy's morale and will to fight. The
militia would seek do this by capturing the enemy's arsenal.
Mao's objective was to mobilize the countryside against the
city, where his enemy was entrenched. He would wear down
the enemy by constant harassment. The final victory in the
People's war was to be achieved by a "strategic
counterof fensive" , carried out by guerrilla units, made up
of regular forces and accompanying militia.
Mao's strategy relied upon preventing armed
aggression against China because of a twofold deterrence:
• the deterrence of a protracted war (as opposed to the
West's strategies of rapid war termination) and if war
ensued,
• after waging a protracted war, threaten the enemy with
annihilation by counterattack. [Ref. 47]
The underlying philosophy of Mao's "People's War"
was pragmatic. China's magnitude and massive population
coalesced by a single guiding ideology would constitute the
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heart of the defensive strategy of China. Mao viewed
manpower as being the deciding factor in winning a war, even
in the face of superior weaponry. A war, supported and
carried out by the people, would have the moral mandate and,
eventually, the superior will to overcome any aggressor.
This view of "man over weapons" underlay the "paper
tiger" argument that, despite the Western powers' decisive
superiority in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, they
would not win a war in China because they would never have a
moral mandate and they never could occupy China. In short,
China would always win a "People's War".
Mao's concept of the superiority of manpower over
weapons relegated the use of nuclear weapons to a supporting
role. This was diametrically opposed to the West's concept
which:
. . .viewed nuclear forces as a cornerstone of their
deterrent capability. . .Nuclear forces are seen by the
Chinese as a supplemental deterrent weapon that prevents
superpower nuclear blackmail. [Ref. 48]
China's concern with "nuclear blackmail" also gave
rise to its belief that limited warfare was a greater threat
than global nuclear war. Since nuclear war would not be
limited, the major characteristic of war would be
conventional. Therefore "People's War" rules would apply
thus reducing the effectiveness of nuclear weapons. While
China recognized the utility of nuclear weapons, it rejected
the idea that the use of nuclear weapons alone would win a
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war. Nevertheless, China vigorously pursued a nuclear
capability while rejecting the West's notion of "massive
retaliation"
.
The Chinese continued to view as the core of its
defense strategy the following:
• vast territory (ample maneuvering room)
;
• a large population;
• a large reserve of manpower which can be mobilized at
its militia training centers in its more than two
thousand counties to fight a "People's War";
• and invaluable experience in using inferior weapons to
counter enemies equipped with superior firepower
This underpinned its claim that nuclear weapons were
entirely defensive and that China would never be the first
to use them. China disavowed any intention of becoming a
nuclear superpower and continually asserted that the main
impetus behind its nuclear weapons development was as a
response to a definite nuclear threat from the United
States. [Ref. 12:p. 19]
China's nuclear program was not without its
political and economic costs. It involved constant
arguments, sacrifice and revisions of the philosophy of
People's War.
Mao believed that the military was to remain a tool
of China's political leaders; who were to be the ultimate
planners of military strategy and rulers of the Chinese
state. This resulted in little military input when deciding
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what types of nuclear weapons to develop. Thus the Chinese
were naive in their development of nuclear weapons, for
example, planning to build long range missiles capable of
targeting their archenemy, the United States, before they
had even manufactured a single rocket or atomic bomb. To
their credit, they did achieve their ambitions but not after
considerable reorganization and reevaluation of what it was
that China really needed in terms of nuclear capability and
what it was capable of developing.
As the danger of preemptive strike from the United
States against China's nascent nuclear facilities [Ref. 49]
receded, China during the 1960 's and 1970 's opted to
sacrifice a near- term comprehensive nuclear weapons
acquisition strategy in favor of a long-term plan tied to
the development of the economy and the broadening of the
technology and industrial base. [Ref. 50] This
course of events underscored the Chinese leadership's
decision to establish conventional deterrence as their basic
defence policy, supplemented by a nuclear force. [Ref. 47 :p.
69]
But then the death of Mao Tse-Tung in 19 76 heralded
the entrance of an era of modernization in China's military
forces and economic policies, and introduced the Deng
Xiaoping stage in the evolution of China's defense strategy.
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2. People's War Under Modern Conditions
Mao's death precipitated a long overdue debate on
what China's defence policy and military strategy should
entail in the face of changing world situation. The
realization that the concept of long protracted war was
anachronistic and that future war would be limited but
intense as exemplified by the 1972 conflict between Egypt
and Israel and the Vietnam War. These conflicts brought
home to the Chinese leadership the advances that the rest of
the world's armed forces had made and the changes in warfare
tactics these advances engendered. The weapons in the
Soviet Union's and American arsenals represented by their
advance air power capabilities and precision guided
munitions rendered the Chinese defensive capability
virtually obsolete and People's War ineffective.
"Positional warfare", "offensive campaign" and
"quick decisive battles" became terms often proffered as a
replacement for the now defunct People's War.
[Ref. 51] Su Yu, political commissar of the
Academy of Military Sciences, clearly called for a change
when he said that:
Some of [Mao's] principles no longer fit the actual
conditions of future wars, and we should
have the courage to break through them. [Ref. 52]
This touched of the internal debate that has been
ongoing since the 19 80' s and centered around several key
issues:
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• the changing threat environment;
• the nature of future war;
• the deployment and use of nuclear weapons;
• nuclear arms control and superpower strategic balance.
[Ref. 75:p. 10]
By 1985, the threat environment facing China had
altered considerably from the earlier Soviet- threat -oriented
war scenarios on which China had based its defense policies.
The United States, under the stewardship of Ronald Reagan
had regained parity with the Soviet Union, and was seen to
once again forcefully oppose Soviet adventurism in foreign
policy affairs resulting in a superpower stalemate. Then
the Sino- Soviet rapprochement following the Gorbachev peace
initiatives in Asia starting with Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan and the unilateral reduction of Soviet forces on
the Sino- Soviet border and leading to the Sino- Soviet summit
in 1989 occurred.
Meanwhile, the fierce military competition between
the United States and the Soviet Union had taken its toll on
both their economies, and as both countries appeared to
enter a general economic decline as compared to the growing
economies of Asia and other third world countries, the
bipolar world gave way to a multipolar environment. This
forced a revision of Chinese thinking now that the
comfortable balance of the Cold War had ended. Instead of a
global war, China was now faced with the possibilities of
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numerous small and regional wars, many of which could break
out on her borders. Zhang Jingyi, a Chinese analyst at the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, voiced this concern:
with the relative decline of the superpowers, regional
powers will feel even more free to use
force. . .bipolarity will lead to a situation of several
hegemonist contending with one another ... the next 20
years... will be a period of limited conventional wars
and armed conflicts of varying scale, duration and
intensity but which still take place under the implicit
threat of nuclear force. [Ref . 53]
Even though the superpowers threat may have
lessened, the emergence of more capable Asian military
powers such as India, Japan, Vietnam and Taiwan refocused
Chinese security concerns on these emerging military
powers .''
The emergence of China's growing economic interests
nnd maritime trade obliged the Chinese to reassess the
significance of open sea trade routes and the threat from
the emerging Asian military powers posed to this critical
conduit for China's economic growth. China needed to start
thinking about stretching its geostrategic boundaries beyond
its land borders if it was going to be able to protect its
growing economic interests.
These realities resulted in the Central Military
Commission's direction in June 1985 that China's war
^ Military expenditures in Southeast Asia for the
decade from 1978 to 1988 grew at a rate of 6.5%, higher than
North America at 5.9%. From World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers. 1989 . U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, October 1990, p. 3.
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preparations would no longer be for an "early, major, and
nuclear war" with the Soviet Union but for local limited war
around China's borders. [Ref. 54 :p. 193] Preparing
for low intensity conflict and regional war became the main
strategy the Chinese military trained for.
Five types of limited war were identified as
critical conflicts that China must prepare for:
• small-scale conflicts restricted to contested border
territory;
• conflict over territorial seas and islands;
• surprise air attacks;
• defense against deliberately limited attacks into
Chinese territory; and
• "punitive counterattacks" launched by China into enemy
territory to "oppose invasion, protect sovereignty, or
to uphold justice and dispel threats." [Ref. 55]
The types of conflicts the Chinese anticipated would
require rapid insertion of troops, taking the initiative,
taking quick decisive action and even launching a preemptive
strike against an enemy. Allowing an aggressor deep into
Chinese territory before striking back was no longer
feasible, China would take the fight to the enemy rather
than allow its borders to be violated and risk major
disruption of its rapidly growing industrial and population
centers
.
This resulted in the formation of rapid deployment
forces, "First Platoons", marine corps, amphibious forces
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and special airborne forces. [Ref. 75 :p. 15] It also
required that commanders be allowed to act freely and
quickly in the face of the threat and be allowed to tailor
his forces to the threat environment. China's vast region
encompassed a wide variety of warfare environments: desert,
coastal, mountain terrain. Different areas would require a
different mix of forces to defend the different regions of
China. This brought about the consensus that China's seven
military regions would conduct independent training and
field exercises tailored to their operational requirements.
Within the military region, the emphasis would still be on
combined arms, quick response and mobile warfare. The
concept of a massive army rising out of the peasant's field
had been discredited and completely eliminated. The
emphasis was on independent defense by each regional
commander of his specific military region.
A feature of this quick, decisive, highly mobile war
was the emergence of troops trained to do this kind of
combat. The designation of these special warfare troops as
"fists" (quantou) illustrates the specialized function of
these soldiers. They are trained as:
"door openers", striking at critical targets and
widening a breach in the enemy's position; as "scalpels"
to strike at targets that, when destroyed, will paralyze
the adversary's combat potential; as "steel hammers" to
seize crucial enemy positions; and as "boosters" to
speed up the tempo of a campaign by opening up new
battle areas within the invaded area. [Ref. 56]
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These "quantou" are airmobile units and are capable of being
deployed anywhere in China within twelve hours. Each
military region has developed its own "quantou" units
specific to their operational requirements.
[Ref. 57] For example, China's growing concern
with its coastal defense and power projection in the South
China Sea has resulted in the development of a marine corps
as the "guantou" units for the South Sea Fleet.
These developments represented the transformation of
the People's Liberation Army into a force prepared for the
key characteristics that Chinese strategists had identified
in modern warfare:
• Three dimensional warfare, warfare that is
simultaneously carried out in the air, on land, and at
sea, and it is difficult to differentiate between the
front line and the rear areas;
• Combined Warfare, combined operations of infantry,
armored units, artillery, marines, and airborne units
under an integrated command; and
• General Warfare, war is not only a trial of military
strength but also a general trial of strength of various
war factors, such as economy, science and technology,
politics, and diplomacy. [Ref. 58]
Changes in modern warfare and implications for
China's warfare tactics continue to capture the military's
attention as exemplified by Zhu Chao, Commander of the Henan
Provincial Military District, who recognized the changes in
modern warfare and pointed them out:
The local wars which broke out since [the] 1970 's have
already shown some of their high technology
characteristics, 1. Troops are highly capable. They are
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capable of not only fighting three-dimensional warfare,
but also fighting independently. With their available
equipment, they are capable of both attacking and
defending while giving first place to attacking the
enemy, 2. They have considerably high capability to
launch strategic air raids and use parachute troopers on
different scales, [refers to Gulf War] 3. Their fire
response is quick and immediate, and their strength in
launching offensives strong. With the coordination of
ground, naval, and air forces and the use of all types
of guided missiles against short, medium and long-range
targets they inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy in
all areas. 4. They also adopted measures against the
enemy's guerilla activities. [Ref. 46]
Zhao goes on to reemphasize the main points presented by the
military strategist and the incorporation of them into
China's modern guerilla warfare tactics and elaborates on
the importance of independently operated units and the
primacy of flexibility and initiative in conducting modern
guerilla warfare:
In waging guerilla warfare against high technoloay, we
must regard the practice of keeping initiative and
flexibility as our soul ... .Being flexible means that we
must not only resolutely, swiftly, secretly and timely
disperse, concentrate or shift our guerilla forces, but
also select the right targets, forms and times in
striking the enemy... [this means] they must be equipped
with modern means of communication, set up reliable
intelligence and information networks, timely understand
the changes in the enemy's situation. . .we must
"block" .. .use electro-magnetic waves to destroy the
enemy's air command, use artificial smoke screens to
blur the enemy's vision and use our own air force to
intercept the enemy helicopters so that they cannot
enter our airspace or accurately hit important
targets... we must "f ight " . . .use our air units to
intercept enemy helicopters group by group and use our
infantry fire to lure the enemy into our ambush areas,
and concentrate our fire power on them. . .we must
emphasize defense" ...familiarize ourselves with the
terrain [and use it against the enemy]. [Ref. 46:p. 38]
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China's reappraisal of its military strategy did not
automatically discount the eventuality of a major nuclear
war and awareness of the use of missiles by foreign armed
forces was noted with interest as represented above. Many
argued, that it was in being prepared for a major nuclear
war that prevented one from actually occurring and probably
had prevented the smaller conflicts China had been engaged
in the past from evolving into limited nuclear war. The
argument calls for continued preparation for major nuclear
war as this would be the only way to ensure China's security
in a complicated and evolving high tech threat environment.
The argument reasserts that any medium nuclear power relies
on the potency of nuclear weapons to keep it free from
superpower manipulations and will prevent interference from
superpowers in small regional wars. With the proliferation
of nuclear weapons worldwide, China must integrate its
nuclear weapons with its conventional strategy in
preparation for limited nuclear war. This has evolved into
the nuclear theater-based exercises that the People's
Liberation Army has engaged in since the early 1980' s.
China's post-Mao defense strategy has eschewed the
naive tactic of an army carried forward with only the force
of its masses. It has evolved into a modern army integrated
with the high technology weaponry and force projection
strategies commonly associated with western armies. In the
wake of the overwhelming superiority of the technological
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threats facing China, it has changed its defence strategy to
better face the challenges of a high tech war. This
transformation is not without its dilemmas however as the
realities of modern warfare clash with the realities of the
economic and social costs of a modern army.
3. Modern Warfare Realities
Since 1977, technology has displaced politics and
ideology as the force motivating Chinese military
policies. [Ref. 47:p. 69]
The disastrous results of the "Great Leap Forward"
and the "Cultural Revolution" on China's economy at the end
of the Mao era forced the new government to adjust its
economic policies resulting in the long term goal of
modernizing China's entire industrial base and stressing
profitability as an impetus for growth rather than central
planning. The modernization of China was to take place in
four key sectors known as the "four modernizations":
agriculture, technology, science and defense. In pursuit of
this goal, the first priority was developing science and
technology as elements of the primary productive force as
well as opening up China's economy to competitive practices.
[Ref. ll:p. 31]
However the cost of the new weapons systems along
with the technology required to produce them were well out
of reach of the Chinese and resulted in a prioritizing of
its modernization that put the military last. Before China
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could begin to modernize its defence to world standards it
first had to rebuild and modernize its industrial and
technology base.
In the meantime, the Chinese leadership, headed by
Deng Xiaoping, directed the military to concentrate on
component, manpower as well as doctrinal modernization. The
Army was withdrawn from the political arena and instructed
to "concentrate on training and defence." [Ref. 59]
Accordingly, much attention was spent conducting field
exercises, concentrating on inter-service drills and
combined arms warfare, and improving soldiers' skills in
anti-tank warfare, air tactics and improving command,
control, and communication skills. Additionally, technical
schools were revamped to better prepare soldiers and
commanders alike. for the technological changes to come.
[Ref. 60]
Despite the modernization efforts begun under Deng
Xiaoping, China recognizes its still inferior nuclear and
conventional capability. The care, feeding and training of
three million men is a major economic drain representing
twenty percent of the central government expenditures in
1988. [Ref. 61] Its military equipment includes
over fifteen thousand four hundred battle tanks; two
thousand eight hundred armored personnel carriers; over six
thousand fixed- wing combat aircraft, including naval
aircraft; ninety- three submarines including one nuclear-
104
powered ballistic-missile submarine and four nuclear-powered
attack submarines and fifty- five destroyers and frigates.
[Ref . 62] The associated cost for upgrading and
modernizing this force is staggering especially when one
considers that much of China's military equipment is based
on Soviet design from the 1950' s and 1960's, poor
competition for the modern armed forces of present day
militaries
.
Additionally, China's modernization in its civilian
sector has exposed it to the vulnerabilities of nuclear and
conventional attack that it once sought to exploit against
the nuclear superpowers, that of large population and
industrial centers, especially in and around its special
economic zones. Some estimates predict that China's urban
population is expected to reach fifty one per cent of tl y
total population by the year 2000. [Ref. 63] With
a large portion of its armaments industry located in the
North and its growing civilian industrial and manufacturing
sectors located along the southern coastal regions, China
has become increasingly more vulnerable to the disruptions
of war. The lethal and destructive force of even a limited
war would be unacceptable to China. The potential damage to
its industrial base, nuclear energy plants and economic base
would make a modern war much more costly than war in the
1960's and 1970's.
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China's logistical tail has increased substantially
with the modernization of the People's Liberation Army but
the legacy of an army trained in guerilla tactics rather
than modern warfare has made its transition more difficult
and expensive. The vulnerabilities of this transitioning
army are exemplified by its weak logistical support systems,
poor mobility, daylight -only fighting capability and its
inferiority in both tactical and strategic nuclear weaponry.
[Ref. 50 :p. 24] Vice- Chairman Yang Shangkun understood the
vulnerabilities of the Chinese forces when he said:
The main contradiction in our armed forces building at
present is the contradiction between modern war and the
low level of our Armed Forces' modernization. [Ref. 64]
With regard to China's preparation for modern
warfare in the 1990 's the nuclear disarmament of the
superpowers was overshadowed by the capabilities of the
western military forces, the United States in
particular, in the Gulf War.
The Gulf War painfully underlined how backward and
unprepared the [People's Liberation Army] is to fight a
modern, high- technology war. One of the most telling
lessons was that superiority in numbers matters very
little against the quality of the weapons which goes
against a fundamental principle of Maoist military
theory. [Ref. 65]
The stark realization of American (and bordering nations)
military capability has refocused the Chinese military on
its current vulnerabilities. This has resulted in a
reevaluation of its capabilities and its strategies during
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the interim period until it can achieve some sort of parity
with its potential military adversaries.
B. CHINA'S EVOLVING NUCLEAR STRATEGY
1. Nuclear Development in the 1980'
s
The realization by Chinese military leadership of
the mandatory incremental modernization of its forces in
concert with the overall modernization of China's industrial
and technological base has resulted in a slow but persistent
increase in its capabilities. This is especially true in
the nuclear field. A look at China's modernization efforts
reveals a substantial increase in the capability of its
nuclear forces indicating an increased emphasis on its
nuclear deterrent capability in the interim until its
conventional capabilities catch up to the potent threat from
western and regional armed forces.
As China's military absorbed the realities of modern
warfare, it also developed modernization strategies similar
in many respects to western forces. Emphasis in developing
a triad of nuclear forces (sea, land and air launched)
;
acquiring capabilities allowing force projection; improving
a limited but effective nuclear counterattack force; keeping
pace with high technology weapons developments and enhancing
strategic defense forces were (and are) all part of the
leadership's priority of enhancing China's nuclear
deterrent. [Ref. 75 :p. 8]
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China's development of a submarine -launched
ballistic missile capability, together with cruise missile
technology, multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons seems to uphold this
postulation. Chinese efforts to enhance the survivability
of their missiles and increasing their second- strike
capability also support this theory.
The development of submarine launched ballistic
missiles underscores the Chinese view that the most capable
deterrent is one that can survive a first strike, and ensure
a second-strike capability. Considering the difficulties
and costs of increasing the survivability of their
vulnerable land-based nuclear deterrent force, a sea-based
nuclear capability made the most sense. This was admitted
by Liu Huaqing, the People's Liberation Army Navy Chief:
In the face of a large-scale nuclear attack, less than
ten percent of the coastal launching silos will survive,
whereas submarines armed with ballistic missiles can use
the surface of the sea to protect and cover themselves,
preserve the nuclear offensive force, and play a
deterrent and containment role. [Ref. 66]
Given the nuclear capabilities of Soviet and United States
ships and the increasing naval capabilities of Japan and
India, this appeared to be a prudent development.
The development of tactical nuclear weapons gave
China a "limited" nuclear strike capability that could give
it a credible nuclear deterrent and a retaliatory strike
capability without escalating a war in the manner that a
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ballistic missile launch would. This underlies China's
assumption that future limited war would still have the
threat of nuclear weapons associated with it.
The emphasis on modernizing its tactical nuclear
capability has coincided with military exercises emphasizing
nuclear and conventional combined arms warfare. Examples of
exercises conducted include:
• In February 1980, the People's Liberation Army conducted
and exercise utilizing tactical nuclear weapons with a
miniaturized nuclear warhead of five kiloton yield;
• China's land and air forces conducted a tactical nuclear
war exercise close to the Sino-Soviet border in June
19 82;
• In mid-October 1987, the East China Sea Fleet of the
Chinese Navy conducted exercises simulating combat under
nuclear warfare conditions in the West Pacific and South
China Sea;
• in June 1988, the navy conducted large-scale exercises
in the East China Sea under simulated nuclear warhead
conditions called "defensive wars under nuclear
conditions"
;
• in July 1988, the People's Liberation Army's nuclear-
capable aircraft off China's coast simulated dropping a
five kiloton nuclear bomb and more than one hundred
chemical munitions onto an enemy naval base;
• in September and October 1988, all of the army's anti-
chemical warfare units were massed to test their combat
performance in China's northeast and Tibet regions.
[Ref. 75:p. 9]
Great interest has been shown in the continued
success in the development and deployment of China's
tactical nuclear weapons. Small, mobile and integrated with
the People's Liberation Army in its strategic missile units,
these weapons were originally intended to counter the Soviet
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threat along the joint Sino- Soviet border. They were
intended to block remote mountain passes and destroy bridges
thereby preventing a Soviet invasion. [Ref. 9:p. 32] From
the point of view of a fundamental Chinese strategy for the
employment of its nuclear weapons, China cannot rely on its
offensive strategic capability because of a basic numerical
and technological inferiority compared to the superpowers.
China can, however, raise the cost of attack to an aggressor
with the promise of a nuclear retaliatory strike. Chinese
reliance on this nuclear deterrent was made clear early in
1982:
We have devised and produced the atom and hydrogen
bombs, long-range guided missiles and other
sophisticated weapons for self -defense .. .This is an
important factor deterring the imperialists form
launching a large-scale invasion against us.
[Ref. 67]
A qualification of the "no-first-use" policy must be
made here. Analysts of China's nuclear policy believe that
the policy refers only to the use of weapons in an offensive
manner against other countries. This does not preclude the
use of Chinese nuclear weapons against an invading force
within China's borders, whether or not that invading force
has used nuclear weapons first. [Ref. 47 :p. 73]
The consensus amongst China defense analysts appears to be
that China's tactical nuclear missiles serve a dual
function. First, they offer the option of countering in
kind a potential Soviet attack supported with nuclear
110
weapons. Second, the use of tactical nuclear weapons would
greatly enhance the defensive capabilities of the army
against a mechanized invading force, an area in which the
People's Liberation Army is still at a disadvantage. The
assumptions have been, of course, that these weapons are to
be deployed against a Soviet aggressor [Ref. 68]
and that the strategic principles of "People's War under
modern conditions" will be followed [Ref. 75:p. 10].
2. Nuclear Strategy
Despite its obvious efforts to field a credible
nuclear strike capability, China insists that its nuclear
strategy is defensive. Returning to the Maoist argument
that nuclear weapons in the hands of "socialists" are
defensive while nuclear weapons in the hands of
"imperialists" are thre.Ltening, Zhang Jianzhi, China's
Defense Minister in 1987, argued the differences between
medium- nuclear states and the two nuclear superpowers.
Zhang considered the superpower concept of nuclear
deterrence equivalent to nuclear blackmail, while the same
deterrent quality in the hands of China was a force to end
or prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. [Ref, 75 :p. 20]
Zhang also identified four functions of the Chinese nuclear
Strategy:
• supplementing manpower shortages;
• deterring an enemy's large-scale offensive, that is,
nuclear weapons and missiles can be used in support of
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an active defense strategy to threaten an enemy's
massing of troops for a large-scale offensive;
• deterring an enemy by forcing him to consider the
serious and unbearable consequences of a nuclear
counterattack; and
• deterring intervention by superpowers in border
conflicts. [Ref. 69]
Drawing from this, Zhang defined China's nuclear strategy as
"limited self-defense" and described the main
characteristics of the nuclear strategy:
• its defensive nature: China will maintain an actual
combat capability primarily for defensive purposes;
• its an ti -deterrent nature: its nuclear force can resist
the superpowers' nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail in
peacetime;
• its self -defensive counterattack nature: "we shall not
attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we
shall certainly counterattack";
• its limited nature: China will develop a nuclear force
of limited quantity but fine quality in the light of its
own national conditions; and
• its effective nature: although China's nuclear strength
is limited, it is reliable. Once it launches a nuclear
counterattack, it undoubtedly will inflict unacceptable
damage on the enemy. [Ref. 70]
These characterizations of China's nuclear strategy
bring up the much debated arguments about whether China's
nuclear strategy is one of minimum deterrence or whether it
marks an aggressive intention. As mentioned earlier, the
complexity and opacity of China's nuclear arsenal make it
difficult to determine what its nuclear strategy actually
is. Some western strategists have described China's nuclear
capability as "minimum deterrence", others have relegated to
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it the amorphous terms of "limited response" or "flexible
deterrence". Yet again, due to its decades-long pursuit of
a viable nuclear capability coupled with policy statements
implying its integration of nuclear weapons into
conventional war, China has also been accused of embracing a
"war fighting" or "deterrence by denial" nuclear strategy.
Chong-Pin Lin, Associate Director of the China
Policy Project at American Enterprise Institute, intimates
that attempts to pigeonhole China's nuclear strategy into
preconceived notions of other nuclear powers' strategies
could lead to erroneous assumptions regarding its true
capabilities, goals and intentions. His assessment of
China's nuclear strategy surmises that neither term applies
completely to China's inferred nuclear strategy and that its
strategy probably consists of an integration of \:he two
definitions of "minimum deterrence" and "war fighting".
Lin takes issue with the theory that China is
practicing "minimum deterrence" and theorizes that it is
better associated with a "war fighting" nuclear strategy
along the lines of the former Soviet Union although not all
the characteristics of a "war fighting" strategy completely
apply to China either. [Ref. 71 :p. 118]
"War fighting" nuclear strategy or "deterrence by
denial" strategy implies the need for diversification over
the entire spectrum of nuclear weapons to cover a broad
range of contingencies. Lin sets forth three capabilities
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conducive to a war fighting strategy which include nuclear
weapons diversification, combined arms force structure and a
decisive tactical nuclear posture. [Ref. 71 :p. 119]
China, to some lesser extent has exhibited all three
of these characteristics. Throughout the 1980 's China had
increased its capabilities beyond a simple nuclear triad to
include six different types of strategic delivery vehicles.
Though this lags behind the former Soviet Union's prolific
twenty- six and the United States' eleven different delivery
vehicles; China has shown a greater attempt at
diversification than either France (four) or Britain (one)
who are more representative of pursuing a "minimum
deterrence" nuclear strategy. [Ref. 71 :p. 120] China's
efforts at diversification have necessitated a wide range of
contingencies requiring strategic ballistic missiles.
China exhibited another characteristic of a war
fighting strategy when it proclaimed a defence policy of
combined arms, consisting of:
an armed force integrating army, navy, artillery troops,
tanks, military engineering troops, anti- chemical units,
and strategic ballistic missile troops.
[Ref. 72]
Its integration of tactical nuclear weapons with its
combined forces exercise, as demonstrated by the earlier
list of exercises, shows a growing tactical capability on
the part of its troops to fight under limited nuclear
scenarios. This encompasses the third characteristic of
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employing nuclear tactics into its general war fighting
stance. The Chinese eschewed the theory, held by the
Soviets, that limited use of nuclear weapons was inherently
escalatory, and have trained for the use of small, tactical
weapons on the battlefield.
"War fighting" nuclear strategy implies that despite
the possibility of nuclear weapons exchanges, the user
intends to continue fighting and fully expects to absorb a
nuclear weapon attack as well as use them. Thence a civil
defence system as well as an anti-ballistic missile defence
system would be requisite for this type of mentality. China
does not have an adequate anti-ballistic missile defence
system but has undertaken extensive civil defense efforts.
They have recognized their vulnerability vis-a-vis an anti-
ballistic missile defense and are attempting to develop the
technologies, especially space technology, to address this
problem. Inherent to civil defense preparations is the
contention that a nuclear war is survivable. China believes
that its advantages of a large population and geographic
size would enable it to suirvive a nuclear war. This has
been tempered somewhat by the economic advancements and all
the accompanying urban growth that adds to the potential
destruction of nuclear war, however China has long
postulated the ability of its country to survive a
protracted war, even a nuclear one. (Reality
notwithstanding, the rhetoric continues.)
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The efficacy of the "war fighting" strategy to China
begins to weaken when judging it in light of the needs of a
massive arsenal; counterforce targeting; command,
communication, control and intelligence survival; strategic
and air defenses and winning. [Ref. 71 :p. 122]
Since a country intent on using nuclear weapons as
deterrence by denial would seek complete destruction of its
opponent, it follows that a massive arsenal of nuclear
weapons would be requisite for ensuring the victorious
outcome of a nuclear war. While China has fulfilled part of
this requirement through its diversification of its
strategic delivery vehicles, it has not, and shows no intent
of, developing massive quantities of weapons. China can
not build a nuclear arsenal that is not within its means
economically. Lin also refers to China's historical
strategic tradition of minimalism which advocates the
minimum use of force and maximizing its effectiveness by
emphasizing quality over quantity. [Ref. 71 :p. 33] Though
China did deviate somewhat from this historical strategic
tradition during Mao's rule, there appears to be a return to
this precedent with the modernization of the People's
Liberation Army and the emphasis on quality over quantity
under the current leadership. This applies emphatically to
its nuclear arsenal.
China also does not engage in counterforce
targeting, rather relying on countervalue targeting with its
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large warhead yields. This is as much dictated by its
current incapabilities for the accurate targeting of its
strategic ballistic missiles and its corresponding
vulnerabilities for the defense of its missiles as its
disinclination to amass a large inventory of nuclear
weapons. Since counterforce targeting is a characteristic
of a war fighting nuclear strategy, China again does not fit
this latter category.
China's inability to flexibly retarget its strategic
missiles (mobility and guidance being a problem for its
longer-range missiles) and the questionable survivability of
its current command, communication, control and intelligence
capabilities after a nuclear war (or conventional one) also
put into doubt its ability to pursue a genuine war fighting
nuclear strategy. In conjunction with its command and
control vulnerabilities, China also lacks the necessary
sophisticated and extensive operations and technology to
mount a viable defense of its strategic and air weapons. It
lacks the advanced missile radars and interceptors, the
anti- satellite weapons, an air defense network and its
accompanying missiles and the antisubmarine forces necessary
for such a capability. Furthermore, it is years from
acquiring the same. [Ref. 71 :p. 122]
Finally, China's strategic tradition of emphasizing
"undefeatability over the achievement of victory" (because a
position of undefeatability depends upon one's own
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preparation, whereas success in battle depends on the enemy
making mistakes and therefore cannot be assured [Ref . 71 :p.
20] ) Its obvious lack of adequate technology prevents it
from pursuing an objective of victory over the opponent in a
possible nuclear war. The object of a war fighting strategy
is victory using overwhelming force and superior defense and
therefore does not fit China's historical strategic
character.
China's nuclear strategy is undefinable in western
terms since quantitatively China exhibits a "minimum
deterrence" strategy but qualitatively and culturally it
exhibits some of the characteristics of "deterrence by
denial". One may conclude that its fundamental strategy
lies somewhere between the two. This ambiguity serves China
well and may reasonably be called deterrence by doubt,
ambiguity and opacity. The enemy never can, really figure




In keeping with the four modernizations of Deng
Xiaoping, the military began its efforts during the 1980' s.
However, the modernization efforts would have to be
incremental and within China's means, a reality still
observed presently as expounded by an article in Jlefangjun
Bao in April 1992;
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The settlement of [the modernization of the military and
the raising of its combat effectiveness] requires a
comparatively long historical process and relies on the
large-scale growth of the country's economy and on the
large-scale improvement of our national defense science
and technology ... this can only proceed gradually, phase
by phase, and step by step. [Ref. 73]
Initially, modernization entailed a number of
actions that at first would seem to countermand the
government's efforts to increase its military capability,
measures in question include a decade of actual defense
budget declines, achieved by cutting back force strength by
one quarter from four million men to just over three million
men; reemphasizing professionalism and soldiering and
downplaying ideological training; and removing the policing
function from the armed forces by establishing a separate
People's Armed Police force not under the control of the
army. Included in the modernization was the upgrading of
equipment for conventional as well as nuclear forces.
Specific to the nuclear forces was the breaJcthrough
in 1983 of a successful solid rocket motor which resulted in
all subsequent missiles being solid propellant fueled. This
increased their reliability and sharply reduced the launch
times of the missiles. [Ref. 9:p. 26] The launch of the
Julang-1, (a submarine launched ballistic missile), in 1982
carried forward the drive for projecting Chinese nuclear
power. By 1984 the Chinese had made significant strides in
its ballistic missile program by developing several types of
intermediate range missiles known as the Deng Feng (DF)
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family with ranges from one thousand two hundred to three
thousand kilometers. These missiles extended China's small
but growing triad of land-based, air launched and sea-based
nuclear weapons.
In 1984, central authorities proclaimed that no
major world war would occur in the coming ten to fifteen
years. Subsequently the Ministry of Space Industry mandated
four fundamental changes: change from liquid to solid
propellants; change from strategic to tactical missiles;
change from first to second generation strategic launchers;
and change from experimental to utilitarian satellite
missions. [Ref. 9:p. 28]
The result of this shift from the rapid development
of long-range missiles to the development of a broader
capability was a deliberate attempt to bring China up to
speed with Western capabilities by the twenty- first century.
Emphasis was also directed towards mobility and
guidance with continuing efforts to achieve guidance and
precision targeting capabilities based on man-made
satellites rather than the current use of stellar guidance.
Despite its emphasis on diversification, China
continued to work on its long-range launch capabilities
which resulted in the ongoing development of the Deng Feng
5, designated to have a range of twelve thousand to fifteen
thousand kilometers and is supposed to be mobile. [Ref. 74]
T
he Deng Feng 5 points out Chinese intentions of developing a
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strategic defense capable of targeting the continental
United States. During the mid- 1980 's China was also
believed to be developing multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicles (MIRV's) for its intermediate range and
intercontinental ballistic missiles which it had flight
tested in 1985 and 1986 on its CSS-2 Intermediate Range
Ballistic Missile's and CSS-4 Inter- continental Ballistic
Missile's. [Ref. 75:p. 4] Despite these
improvements to its land-based missiles, however, China has
not quantitatively increased it land-based nuclear weapons
with only an estimated three hundred warheads deployed.
[Ref. 75:p. 5]
Continuing modernization during the 1990 's has
brought about an increase of twelve to fifteen percent in
the military budget reflecting raising salaries of the
professional army and increased expenditures for the
purchase of modern equipment for the separate elements
making up the People's Liberation Army. [Ref. 76]
The result has been a steady though incremental growth in
its conventional and nuclear capability projected to
continue into the next decade. [Ref. 76 :p. 84]
Along with its continuing improvements to its
strategic ballistic missile capabilities, China has
concentrated on its tactical nuclear offensive missile
capability. [Ref. 50 :p. 22] In addition to developing these
new weapons it has concentrated on increasing the accuracy,
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reliability and survivability of its existing arsenal. The
upgrading of China's nuclear capability remains in keeping
with its original strategy that plans to employ its nuclear
weapons in combination with is conventional forces if
attacked, but still represents a small deterrent capability
vice a massive nuclear capability, (refer Appendix E) China
has expended a great deal of effort to strengthen its
nuclear deterrent and is relying on continued nuclear
advancements to maintain its defense even though the
superpowers are downsizing their nuclear arsenals.
2 . Nuclear Arsenal
China's current inventory of strategic ballistic
missiles as well as their conventional missiles and some of
their specifications are presented in Appendix F.
3. Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities
Despite these developments however, China does have
several weak links in its nuclear deterrent capability as
well as its overall military capability. This is
demonstrated by its lack of Command, Control, Communications
and Intelligence (C^I) capabilities; large gaps in its
detection system for incoming missiles; its small and
archaic submarine fleet and lack of aircraft carriers
affecting its maritime power projection capabilities; its
lack of stealth technology or anti- stealth countermeasures;
lack of Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft; lack
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of advanced precision-guided munitions; inadequate
electronic warfare systems; and its small numbers of nuclear
warheads compared to the United States and Russia. It is
also trying to upgrade its strategic air defenses.
China has identified key technologies to help them
address these vulnerabilities. Among the areas noted in the
"Outline of Medium and Long-Term Science and Technology
Development for the Year 2000-2 02 0" are:
• Stealth technology: radar- indiscernible structure
architecture, radar- indiscernible material, stealth
wave-bands, laser, infrared, composite materials,
electronic countermeasures
;
• Telecommunications: communications satellite systems
upgrades, introduction of advanced satellite earth
station terminals, digital communications technology;
• Space and Aerospace systems: fighter aircraft,
microelectronics, software engineering, high performance
computing, power and energy systems; improved satellite
launch vehicles, manned space vehicles, sensitive
radars
;
• Other high technology areas targeted: biotechnology,
lasers, automation and robotics, advanced materials,
artificial intelligence, aeronautics, energy
technologies including: magnetohydrodynamic energy
systems and advanced nuclear reactor technology.
[Ref. 77:p.6,8]
Many of these technologies are dual -use and therefore,
cooperation with foreign countries in attaining and
developing these capabilities is an achievable possibility
for China. Although China has emphasized indigenous
development of its own technologies and sciences, it intends
to link its internal efforts with imported advanced foreign
technologies and foreign experts and then "digest,
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assimilate, upgrade and renew" the imported technologies.
[Ref. 43, 77:p. 9]
D. CONCLUSION
China has recognized that its previous emphasis on
People's War and guerilla tactics no longer presents an
adequate defense for China in the face of modern warfare.
The resultant modernization of the People's Liberation Army-
requires an enormous amount of capital and advanced
technologies and sciences that are presently beyond the
reach of China's current capabilities. Therefore,
modernization of the military will be irrevocably tied to
the modernization of China's technology and science base,
which in turn, will substantially influence China's economic
resurgence. In the interim, nuclear weapons and strategic
delivery vehicles will fulfil the two- fold purpose of
ensuring China's defense during the lengthy modernization
period and, through the sale of certain weapons systems,
help finance the People's Liberation Ariny's modernization.
The incremental growth and diversification of China's
nuclear capabilities are doubly troubling because of the
opacity of China's evolving nuclear strategy. Its
incompatibility with western definitions of either "minimum
deterrence" or "war fighting" make it difficult to divine
China's nuclear intentions. China's emphasis on advanced
technologies and their military, as well as civilian
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applications, also enhance the belief that China is pursuing
a more advanced and equivalent nuclear capability on par
with current modern armed forces in the West. However,
concerns that China is bent on achieving nuclear superiority
and is intent on global supremacy or even regional hegemony
are incompatible with China's strategic historical
characteristics vis-a-vis its military strategies and goals.
Additionally, China's economic constraints, its realization
of its limitations; its major vulnerabilities in its defence
posture and its emphasis on economic growth vice rapid
modernization of a huge but archaic armed force conspire
against the theory of a militaristic and nuclearly superior
China. China's efforts to improve its nuclear forces are
concentrated on quality not quantity and is more in keeping




China began its nuclear endeavors to protect itself
against a threat it felt it could not equal much less
defeat, the United States of America. By pursuing its
nuclear capability it hoped only to give pause to any
aggressor with the hopes of preventing a war by its superior
political skill rather than its vast but underdeveloped
army. China sought to be "undefeatable" not superior. The
entire focus of post -Mao China has been to retain this
position through the modernization of its military
capabilities
.
The dilemma has been how to modernize its military
capability against ever increasing technical superiority
without appearing aggressive and adventuristic . More to the
point, how to pay for the modernization of an army equipped
with 1950 's technology into an army capable of engaging a
twenty- first century equipped enemy?
The answer was a difficult one. It could not be made in
the vacuum of military imperative only. China needed to
revamp its entire ideological, economic and sociological
practices. Deng Xiaoping knew this and thus was born the
"four modernizations", "Socialism with Chinese
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Characteristics", and the earnest pursuance of the "Five
Principles of Cooperation" in its relations with nations.
To underscore the order in which China must remake
itself and to emphasize that this order be followed, Deng
Xiaoping put military modernization last . behind science and
technology, agriculture and industry. Indeed, Deng
Xiaoping' s major domestic goals for the next twenty years
revolved around the improvement of the lives of the Chinese
people, not the aggrandizement of China's military as
repeated here:
The initial stage of socialism in China is a protracted
historical stage which will take at least 100 years.
Deng Xiaoping has put forth a fighting goal to be
reached in three steps: The first step from 1980 to
1990 is to basically solve the problem of providing
enough to eat and wear; the second step from 1990 to the
end of this century is to enable the people to lead a
comparatively well off life; and the third step is to
reach the level of the intermediate developed countries
by the middle of the next century (before spring of
1986, it was to approach the level of the developed
countries). [Ref. ll:p. 28]
The implication of these goals was that China would have
to concentrate on its internal development, not on
aggression and war with its neighbors or the United States.
Furthermore, with the introduction of "Socialism with
Chinese characteristics" and the emphasis on technology and
science as the key to China's future, good relations with
nations capable of providing China with the tools to reach
its ends were an imperative. This was underscored by Qiao
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Shi, chairman of the National People's Congress Standing
Committee:
It can be said that we have the ability to be self-
reliant in the world. Our defense policy has
consistently been devoted to self-defense, and it will
continue to be so. It is impossible for us to expand to
other countries, and we are opposed to hegemonism. Some
people have been disseminating the view in the
international community to the effect that if China
becomes strong in the future, it will be a threat to
other countries. This is groundless. In the special
speech by Mr. Deng Xiaoping in 1974, he said "China will
never become a superpower. If, indeed, China becomes a
superpower, other nations should join hands and defeat
China." This policy remains unchanged. [Ref. 78]
However, above all else China, must remain independent
and self-reliant in its growth. The price of China's
modernization was not to be paid with capitulation to
foreign desires and influences. China is socialist, it is
non-aligned and it will progress on its own terms and in its
own way. This has been China's basic premise since its
inception as iterated by Deng Xiaoping:
Independence, self-reliance, and charting our own course
are the political foundations of the theory on building
socialism with Chinese characteristic ... [this has]
always been and will always be our basic stand.... [Ref.
ll:p. 28]
Nonetheless, the growth in capability of China's
military is still regarded as threatening. Despite its
claims to the contrary, the increasing capability of its
nuclear forces as well as its reorganization along modern
military lines poses a new challenge to the region. Again, -
however, taken in the context of a China that has been
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underdeveloped for the majority of its modern history, it is
not inconceivable that it is merely trying to develop a
realistic defensive capability. This is an argument that is
put forward time and again by the Chinese government:
In today's turbulent world, all countries must possess
the necessary means to protect their own safety at any
time. This is common sense. For a long period, China
had time and again reduced its military expenditure to
such a low level that its outmoded equipment now lags
behind that of Western countries by more than 20 years.
It is natural for China to purchase some weapons from
friendly countries and improve its equipment as planned.
Many countries are also updating their weapons and
equipment in accordance with their development programs.
[Ref. 79]
Furthermore, China has repeatedly called for the
Putting aside of disputes and carrying out joint
development while upholding sovereignty. .
.
as evidenced by its improving relations with Vietnam, India,
Russia, Japan, and other Asian countries. Pessimism may
construe this as a Chinese ploy to exert its will in the
region and the buildup of its military as a precursor to its
becoming a regional hegemonist. However, China's needs and
its means do not support this view. China requires
stability, good relations and tremendous amounts of economic
exchanges to revitalize its standard of living and economy.
To risk its future by embarking on a course of aggression
and hegemonism is not only not in keeping with China's
historical past, it is ultimately self-defeating.
Granted, the need for tremendous amounts of currency for
the modernization of its country has spawned unwelcome and
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even destabilizing practices by China. The most notable of
these being its missile sales to the Middle East. However,
the need for technology transfers and cash presents a two
sided argument in that China must also temper its practices
to suit the concerns of the Western nations upon which its
relies so heavily on for the sources of its modernization
efforts. China cannot afford to alienate the very states it
is depending upon to aide in its growth.
This especially applies to its nuclear policies. This
realization has already resulted in China's altering its
positions on several nuclear issues and by its formally
acceding to several of the nonproliferation regime's
treaties. China no longer advocates the spread of nuclear
weapons throughout the world, there is no indication that it
has ever transferred nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons
production technology to another nation. It has engaged in
many similar practices that the Western nations have engaged
in with respect to the transfers of nuclear energy
technology, weapons transfers and dual -use technology. It
has sold its wares to the same areas that the United States
has for years sold its arms. In short, many of the things
that China is doing are not exclusive to China.
What is different is China's unwillingness to impose
constraints on its clients; viewing this as unwarranted
interference into a nation's sovereign affairs. Self-
defense is the purview of every nation. How a nation goes
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about ensuring its security is none of China's business,
except to the extent that it can profit from it!
This independent and mercantilism approach to foreign
policy is the root of the dispute between China and the
United States vis-a-vis its arms transfer policies, defense
policies and even its human rights stance. China believes
no nation has the right to impose its standards and
principles upon another nation; while the United States
believes there are standards of conduct and principles that
all nations should follow and must embrace. In short, China
engages in the same conduct towards other nations that it
demands for itself, complete noninterference in its
sovereign affairs. Hardly the cast of a nascent nuclear
hegemonistic power!
It follows that the challenge from China is not a
military challenge but a foreign policy challenge in which
China and the United States must find equal ground and
accommodate each other's views and positions.
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
The end of the Cold War requires the United States to
reevaluate its foreign policy premises and redefine the
basis of its relationships with allies and non-allies alike.
The bipolar and divisive nature of the old Soviet versus
United States enmity that guided our foreign policies for so
long must be swept away. The United States should view its
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relations with nations on their own merits and on their own
cultural, ideological and historical premises, not in the
light of the old Soviet versus American alliances.
This especially applies to China. China's emergence as
a potential economic and military power engaged in the
global economy cannot and should not be ignored. Nor should
it be outcast as a relic of the "old communist bloc" and a
latent threat to global security. As a nuclear power in its
own right, and as one of the largest nations on earth,
China's participation in global security is an imperative.
We must attempt to include China in all aspects of
international relations and must try to understand China's
views on different issues.
This may be difficult. There are many differences
between China and the United States, especially with respect
to nuclear issues. What follows are some suggestions on how
United States foreign policies can be adapted to engage
China in meaningful dialogue on nuclear issues. These
measures are not only exclusive to nuclear issues or to
China. They represent a method of "doing business" that is
not automatically dictatorial or insensitive to the concerns
and national characteristics of other nations.
With respect to China; as a member of the United Nations
Council, a country with the largest military in the world,
and as a country undergoing fundamental ideological and
sociological change, a special sensitivity should be
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accorded to it in our relations. China's biggest gripe with
the United States is our insistence in dealing with it from
a purely superpower stance. We do not treat China as an
equal. This especially holds true in our negotiations
concerning global security issues such as disarmament,
nuclear proliferation and arms control. The habit of
engaging only the former Soviet Union in the preliminary
negotiations regarding nuclear issues and not bringing to
the table China and the other medium nuclear powers from the
onset, revealed a disregard for their security interests and
a tacit acknowledgement between the two superpowers that
only our interests counted.
Future negotiations regarding nuclear issues that affect
global security concerns should include China and its views
from the beginning. Issues concerning global ballistic
missile defence systems, comprehensive test bans, arms
control to the Middle East and Asia, and even future
disarmament negotiations between Russia and the United
States should include China and its security interests.
The Missile Technology Control Regime needs to be
revamped to take into account the interests of all suppliers
and recipients and include all nations, not just the small
exclusive club of Western nations who make up all the rules
regarding missile technology transfers. These rules are
discriminatory, inflexible and unrealistic. Rather than
trying to prevent the proliferation of missiles, which is
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not fair to those nations who do not currently have this
defensive ability, the regime should concentrate on the safe
transfer and receipt of relevant technologies. It should
engender an atmosphere of openness about capabilities rather
than forcing nations with security concerns to be
clandestine about their transactions. All exporting nations
should be given verifiable guarantees by all recipients that
transferred technologies will not be diverted from their
stated purpose. Any nation wanting to export the
technologies should be invited to become a full member in
the regime and entitled to the full rights accorded a full
member. Intelligence sharing, participation in global
disarmament mechanisms, participation in communal efforts to
address regional security concerns of recipients and
suppliers should be accorded to all members of the regime.
Global disarmament talks should begin to take place with
special efforts made to address the security concerns of
unstable regions such as the Middle East. Bilateral talks
brokered by only the superpowers do not adequately address
the interests of all nations in the region.
All regional nations' participation in regional security
matters should be encouraged; for example, concerns about
the Korean Peninsula need to be addressed by China, Japan,
South Korea, North Korea as well as the Southeast Asian
nations, not just the United States, Russia and Japan. The
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same can be said for addressing the issue of Myanmar, the
Spratly Islands and other Asian areas of conflict.
Engagement by all nations in security matters rather
than just power brokering between the superpowers will
foster a more stable global environment that better
addresses the security needs of different regions. The
United States, by taking the lead in inviting all interested
parties to the negotiation table, regardless of regime
ideology, can go a long way towards fostering peaceful
resolutions to security concerns.
Finally, while the emphasis on global democratization is
a noble aspiration for the United States to engender, it is
not a practical or necessarily feasible foreign policy goal.
Many nations do not have the requisite building blocks to.
form viable democracies. Many do not have the historical
and cultural perspectives that would readily embrace a
democratic system of government. Not being a democracy,
does not necessarily mean that the regime is morally
bankrupt or an oppressive totalitarian state.
Rather than push "democracy" as a favored foreign policy
goal, we should stress open communication with all nations,
economic growth for all nations and a stable and peaceful
global environment for all. We must recognize the right of
each nation to determine its own form of government and to
set its own social standards. Security and political issues
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should address regional realities, not outside influences
from distant actors.
These are not easy guidelines to follow for American
foreign policy makers. It is difficult to include the views
of all nations, especially nations that we view with
suspicion and reticence as is the case with China. Perhaps
the first step would be to accept China for what it says it
is; a nation attempting to better the lives of its people
and ensuring the security of its nation in a dangerous and
potentially unstable world. Coming from a perspective of
trust and mutual respect, rather than one of disbelief and
combativeness will do much to foster relations between our
two nations.
C. CONCLUSION
China's current nuclear policies and capabilities, while
becoming more powerful, still represent a modest endeavor
rather than a forced attempt to become a nuclear superpower
capable of matching the United States. China's nuclear
capability ensures its prestige among the more militarily
capable nations and economically advanced powers and gives
it a stronger voice in the arena of international affairs.
In the modern military environment China has foreseen that
its military capabilities are in danger of rapidly being
rendered obsolete, especially its nuclear capabilities. It
has therefore continued the gradual but successful
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modernization of its nuclear forces to prepare for these new
challenges, a premise that has been the mainstay of its
nuclear development program since its inception.
The modernization of its nuclear forces is linked to
its economic policy and national development thereby serving
two purposes
:
• the modernization of its military coincides with a major
impetus for technological and scientific advancement of
China's overall industrial base;
• the modernization of its force is subordinate to and
supportive of the economic realities of its new
economic policies of open markets, profit motivation and
the advancement of the Chinese people's quality of life.
It is not unreasonable to assume that China's nuclear
forces are being modernized as a part of an overall economic
plan that requires the military to pay for its modernization
on its own ana not at the expense of the Chinese people's
newly emerging prosperity. Modernization is intended for
the defense of China and is in keeping with the security
needs of a great power center in a rapidly changing region
of the world.
Additionally, China continues to grapple with its own
internal uncertainties regarding a communist regime
endeavoring to embrace open market reforms without
completely delegitimizing itself. Avoidance of internal
chaos and self destruction are arguably China's primary
focus not world domination. A stable, cooperative and
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peaceful world are as important to China's security and
economic goals as they are to the United States.
United States' foreign policy towards China should take
on a substantially more relevant and pragmatic stance rather
than treating China as a communist threat that must be
destroyed. Understanding China today - -helping rather than
hindering its progress; and seeking peaceful consensus in
those areas of disagreement between the two nations- -should
be the logical end of American policy.
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APPENDIX A
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, December 2, 1954
The Parties to this Treaty,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live
in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring
to strengthen the fabric of peace in the West Pacific Area,
Recalling with mutual pride the relationship which
brought their two peoples together in a common bond of
sympathy and mutual ideas to fight side by side against
imperialist aggression during the last war,
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of
unity and their common determination to defend themselves
against external armed attack, so that no potential
aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them
stands alone in the West Pacific Area, and
Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for
collective defense for the preservation of peace and
security pending the development of a more comprehensive
system of regional security in the West Pacific Area,
Have agreed as follows:
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Article I
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of
the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in
which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace, security and justice are
not endangered and to refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force in any manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
Article II
In order more effectively to achieve the objective of
this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help
and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual
and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist
subversive activities directed from without against their
territorial integrity and political stability.
Article III
The Parties undertake to strengthen their free
institutions and to cooperate with each other in the
development of economic progress and social well-being and




The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their
deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding
the implementation of this Treaty.
Article V
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West
Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of
the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety
and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional processes.
Article VI
The Government of the Republic of China grants, and the
Government of the United States of America accepts, the
right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces
in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required
for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement.
Article VIII
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted
as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the
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Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the
responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
Article IX
This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of China
and the United States of America in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes and will come into force
when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged
by them at Taipei.
Article X
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either
Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given
to the other party.
SOURCE: Lasater, Martin L., The Taiwan Issue in Sino-




COMPARISON OF NUCLEAR POWER'S YEARS BETWEEN THE FIRST ATOMIC
DETONATION AND ACQUISITION OF OTHER TECHNOLOGIES
US USSR UK FRANCE CHINA
H-BOMB 7 yrs 4 yrs 5 yrs 8 yrs 3 yrs
SPACE
SATELLITE
13 yrs 8 yrs 10 yrs 6 yrs
ICBM 15 yrs 8 yrs 16 yrs
SLBM 15 yrs 12 yrs * 8 yrs 18 yrs
MIRV 2 3 yrs 24 yrs * 20 yrs 22 yrs
* UK incorporated US Polaris SLBM (MIRVed) therefore not
counted as an indigenous effort
SOURCE: adapted from Lin, Chong-Pin, China's Nuclear
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SOURCE: Lewis, John Wilson and Xue Litai, China Builds the
Bomb
, pp. 56-58, Stanford University Press, 1988.
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APPENDIX D
STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, OCTOBER 16,19 64
China exploded an atomic bomb at 15:00 hours on October
16, 1964, thereby successfully carrying out its first
nuclear test. This is a major achievement of the Chinese
people in their struggle to strengthen their national
defence and oppose the U.S. imperialist policy of nuclear
blackmail and nuclear threats.
To defend oneself is the inalienable right of every
sovereign state. To safeguard world peace is the common
task of all peace-loving countries. China cannot remain
idle in the face of the ever- increasing nuclear threats from
the United States. China is conducting nuclear tests and
developing nuclear weapons under compulsion.
The Chinese Government has consistently advocated the
complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear
weapons. If this had been achieved, China need not have
developed nuclear weapons. But our proposal has met with
stubborn resistance from the U.S. imperialists. The Chinese
Government pointed out long ago that the treaty on the
partial halting of nuclear tests signed in Moscow in July
1963 by the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union was
a big fraud to fool the people of the world, that it had
increased, and not decreased, the nuclear threat of U.S.
imperialism against the people of China and of the whole
world. Even at that time, the U.S. Government openly
declared that the conclusion of this treaty did not in the
least mean that the United States would not conduct
underground tests or that it would not use, manufacture,
stockpile, export or spread nuclear weapons. Facts over the
past year and more have fully proved this point.
During this period, the United States had not stopped
manufacturing various nuclear weapons on the basis of
nuclear tests it has already conducted. Seeking ever-
greater perfection, the United States has, moreover, during
this same period conducted several dozen underground nuclear
tests to improve further the nuclear weapons it
manufactures. In stationing nuclear submarines in Japan,
the United States is posing a direct threat to the Japanese
people, the Chinese people, and the peoples of all other
Asian countries. Through the so-called multilateral nuclear
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force, the United States is now trying to put nuclear
weapons into the hands of the West German revanchists,
thereby threatening the security of the German Democratic
Republic and the other socialist countries in Eastern
Europe. U.S. submarines carrying Polaris missiles with
nuclear warheads are prowling the Taiwan Straits, the Bac Bo
Gulf (Tonkin Gulf) , the Mediterranean Sea, the Pacific
Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic Ocean, everywhere
threatening peace-loving countries and all the peoples who
are fighting against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-
colonialism. Under these circumstances, how can it be
considered that U.S. nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats
against the people of the world have ceased to exist just
because of the false impression created by the temporary
halting of atmospheric tests by the United States?
The atomic bomb is a paper tiger. This famous statement
by Chairman Mao Tse-tung is known to all. This was our view
in the past and this is still our view at present. China is
developing nuclear weapons not because it believes in their
omnipotence nor because it plans to use them. On the
contrary, in developing nuclear weapons, China's aim is to
break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers and to
eliminate nuclear weapons.
The Chinese Government is loyal to Marxism- Leninism and
proletarian internationalism. We believe in the people. It
is the people, and not any weapons, that decide the outcome
of a war. The destiny of China is decided by the Chinese
people, while the destiny of the world is decided by the
people of the world, and not by nuclear weapons. China is
developing nuclear weapons for defence and for protecting
the Chinese people from U.S. threats to launch a nuclear
war.
The Chinese Government hereby solemnly declares that China
will never at any time or under any circumstances be the
first to use nuclear weapons.
The Chinese people resolutely support all the oppressed
nations and peoples in their struggles for liberation. We
firmly believe that, by relying on their own struggles and
by helping one another, the people of the world are bound to
triumph. China's success in making nuclear weapons is a
great encouragement to the revolutionary people of the world
in their struggles and a great contribution to the cause of
defending world peace. On the question of nuclear weapons,
China will not commit the error of adventurism or the error
of capitulationsism. The Chinese people can be trusted.
The Chinese Government fully understands the good
intentions of peace-loving countries and peoples in
demanding an end to all nuclear tests. But more and more
countries are coming to realize that the more exclusive the
monopoly of nuclear weapons held by the U.S. imperialists
and their partners, the greater the danger of a nuclear war.
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They are very arrogant when they have such weapons, they
will not be so haughty, their policy of nuclear blackmail
and nuclear threats will not be so effective, and the
possibility of complete prohibition and thorough destruction
of nuclear weapons will increase. We sincerely hope that a
nuclear war will never break out. We are deeply convinced
that, so long as all peace-loving countries and peoples make
joint efforts and persist in the struggle, nuclear war can
be prevented.
The Chinese Government hereby solemnly proposes to the
governments of the world that a summit conference of all the
countries of the world be convened to discuss the question
of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of
nuclear weapons, and that as the first step, the summit
conference conclude an agreement to the effect that the
nuclear power and those countries which may soon become
nuclear powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons either
against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones or
against each other.
If those countries in possession of large numbers of
nuclear weapons are not even willing to undertake not to use
them, how an they expect countries not yet in possession of
such weapons to believe in their sincerity for peace and to
refrain from taking defensive measures that are necessary
and within their capabilities?
The Chinese Government will, as always, exert every effort
to promote, through international consultations, the
realization of the lofty aim of complete prohibition and
thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Until that day
comes, the Chinese Government and people will firmly and
unswervingly follow their own path to strengthen their
national defence, defend their motherland, and safeguard
world peace.
We are convinced that man, who creates nuclear weapons,
will certainly be able to eliminate them.
SOURCE : From Break the Nuclear Monopoly. Eliminate Nuclear
Weapons
, pp. 1-5, Beijing, 1965 as cited in Lewis, John
Wilson and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb , pp. 241-242,
Stanford University Press, 1988.
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APPENDIX E
CHINESE VERSUS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
United States Nuclear Forces 1 June 1992: [ ( ) =Yr 2003]
Delivery Launchers Warheads per Total
Vehicle Deployed Launcher Warheads
ICBM
Minuteman II 450(0) 1(0) 450(0)
Minuteman III 500(500) 3(1) 1,500(500)
MX 50(0) 10(0) 500(0)











Sub- total SLBM 696(432) - 5,952(1,728)
Total Ballistic
Missiles 1,696(932) - 8,402(2,228)
Bombers
ALCM- equipped
B-52 150(95) 10(8) 1,500(952)
B-52 28(0) 20(0) 540(0)
Non-ALCM
B-52 278(0) 1(0) 278(0)
B-IB 95(0) 95(0) 1(0)
B-2 0(20) 0(16) 0(320)
Total Bombers 551(115) - 2,413(1,272)
GRAND TOTAL 2,247(1,047) - 10,810(3,500)
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Some DF-5 ICBMs are believed to be equipped with
MIRV. The estimate given by the IISS is six, but the
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, CIA and SIPRI, China
possesses ten DF-4's and DF-5's each.
China has two Xia- class SSBNs and one Golf -class SSB,
In 1988, only one Xia- class submarine was operational.
Three more Xia-class SSBNs are under construction.
Estimates of nuclear bombs in China's possession vary
from 200-400. All bombs are carried by H-6 and H-5
aircraft
.




Stockholm International Institute for Peace,
1992; Lennox, Duncan, ed. Jane's Strategic Weapon's Systems .
Jane's Information Group, 1990; Malik, J. Mohan, "Chinese
Debate on Military Strategy: Trends and Portents", pp. 5-6,
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SOURCES: Lennox, Duncan, Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems .
Jane's Air- Launched Weapons , Jane's Naval Weapon Systems
.
Jane's Theater Defence Systems . Jane's Information Group,
1990. and The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance. 1990-1991 . Brassey's, 1992.
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APPENDIX 6
CHINA'S ARMS SALES BUREAUCRACY
CHINA'S ARMS-SALES MILITARY ORGANIZATION
Administrative Office
(bangongting)
Centrai Military commission of
the Communist Party of China
State Council of the
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